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ABSTRACT
BIBLICAL THEISM ENHANCED OR TRANSFORMED? AN EVALUATION OF PAUL 
TILLICH'S CONCEPT OF GOD.
This dissertation seeks to establish whether Paul Tillich s 
God-concept is theistic or not. Has Tillich transformed theism into 
something else? To answer this question requires a detailed exam­
ination of Tillich's concept of "being-itself" as a translation of 
the term "God". It can be established that the concept has a place 
within Christian tradition, and may be seriously considered as an 
alternative description to the supranaturalistic idea of God. In 
this latter conception, which still has broad acceptance today, God 
is seen as a being, an object located somewhere in space. The 
primitive and anthropomorphic nature of such a description of God 
is criticised in this dissertation; such a conception must give way 
to a more sophisticated one.
The concept of "being-itself"t though, must be tested against the 
nominalist objection that there are only existing beings and that 
there is no category of "existence" or "being". This dissertation 
shows how an idealist model for being-itself can be defended against 
the objections of nominalism. However, Tillich is not an idealist 
(as is amply shown) and because of this the concept Of being-itself 
loses much of its forcefulness. For if, as Tillich insists, creator 
and creation are distinct and separate from each other, then what 
can the terms "being-itself" and "ground of being" mean? The term 
"ground" could only mean "source", not "underlying substance". It 
is argued, though, that Tillich wants the term (and, by extension, 
"being-itself") to imply both meanings at once, so as to give force
Zerbst--ii
to an immanentist theology without surrendering the notion of God's 
transcendence. In other words, Tillich's theology is accused of a 
certain ambiguity and imprecision.
Yet even if the terra "beirtg-itself" seems unsatisfactory, Tillich s 
idea that God is forcefully present within the world of men is 
defensible without an insistence on the term. It is argued that 
the idea of Spirit can convey such nearness and, further, it is 
contended that this term is the only satisfactory one to describe 
God. In the dissertation it is pointed out that "Spirit can imply 
a "surrounding" omnipresence as easily as it can imply an inhab­
iting" omnipresence. If God is perceived as "Surrounding Spirit", 
then an immanentist theism, which has a strong emphasis on religious 
experience as the factor which establishes the existence of God, 
can be formulated. Idealism (the model in which Spirit "inhabits" 
matter) is then avoided; it is argued that this is necessary if 
God's transcendence is to be maintained.
The second half of the dissertation examines the extent of Tillich's 
appeal outside the boundaries of traditional theism. Does 
Tillich's concept of God broaden, and thus enhance, the appeal of 
theism? The answer, in the mainj is affirmative. To be sure, 
Tillich's description of the awareness of the Ultimate cannot con­
vince the atheist of the existence of God. Yet such a description 
certainly points the wav to an understanding of what such a con­
viction entails.
Outside of his appeal to the atheist, it is argued that Tillich s 
theology has been important in establishing Christian dialogue with 
other faiths and in contributing to the debate on religious
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secularity. Even if Tillich has expressed serious reservations 
about the "Radical Theology" he is said to have inspired, one could 
also claim a success for Tillich in this field in that he has helped 
to spawn a religious school of thought which is at least vigorous 
and adventurous, Radical theologians clearly state that Tillich 
provided them with a mandate to explore the God-concept in an un­
restricted way, and even if the arguments of this school go beyond 
what Tillich felt was acceptable, one must at least concede that 
these theologians have revitalised religious thought, This 
revitalisation owes much to Tillich, whose stress oil God s 
immanence and our experience of him in this secular realm, has done 
much to re-emphasise the immediacy of the divine presence in the 
life of man.
The conclusion arrived at in this dissertation is that, despite 
certain terminological imprecisions, Tillich's theology enhances 
theism without transforming it. Paul Tillich, it is held, must be 
seen as a theologian of the greatest consequence,
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This study was undertaken with the purpose of determining the cur­
rent philosophical position with respect to theism's most central 
concept, the idea of God. I determined to investigate this concept 
through the theology of Paul Tillich, whom I consider to be of the 
utmost importance for present and future debates concerning what 
God is and what He is to be in the minds of men.
My dissertation, I hope, contributes something of value to a period 
of theological uncertainty, in which the traditional concept of God 
is under careful and serious review. I feel confident that I have 
shown th&t the modern church will have to take earnest cognizance 
of Paul Tillich's concept of God in its ongoing deliberations on 
the nature of the divine.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION: PAUL TILLICH AND THE "HONEST TO GOD" DEBATE
"the basic, theological question," says Paul Tillich, '.is the ques­
tion of God." [Tillich, ST I, p 181, 1955] Religion, in the 
Judeo-Chfistian. context, requires a clear and understandable pic­
ture of God. The worshipping believer, though, is more encouraged 
to establish a "relationship" with God than define him. Neverthe­
less, the same believer must have some Mea of the nature of that 
to which he dedicates himself. Theology must attempt to tell us 
something of God's nature, for the whole Judeo-Christian tradition 
revolves around its concept of God.
In the western world a traditional picture of God has been built 
up, The picture, in simplified form, is as follows: God ,s a
person, an entity, inhabiting a spatial realm beyond the earth, 
From this realm he watches earthly events, and influences them as 
he sees fit. It is at once noticeable that such a conception has 
a strong anthropomorphic element, God is seen as a person, albeit 
a perfect one, operating from a domestic base. This person is an 
entity, i.e. he is physically circumscribed in his being, This 
person inhabits a region somewhere in the cosmos, to which region 
purified souls ascend.
Presented thus, the picture seems almost to be a parody. 
Theologians who uphold the traditional view would be quick to remark 
that, helpful as the picture presented above may be, it should not 
be taken literally. God's essence, they would contend, cannot be 
expressed within the categories available to us; much of what we
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say about God is, of necessity, symbolic, But the idea of a mighty 
being in the sky remains, no matter what caveats are sounded in 
order to lend sophistication to the idea.
The traditional western concept of God is, in essence, a remarkably 
primitive one. Tillich's concept of God is not a refinement of the 
traditional model. His description of God transcends the familiar 
conception. Tillich's appreciation of the importance of upholding 
God's infinity has led him to reject the idea that God is a being 
at all, A being is a finite entity, subject to forces and influ­
ences beyond itself. God cannot be subject to the categories of 
finitutie, so he cannot be a being, Tillich describes God as 
"being-itself"j a term which requires a wide and detailed exegesis. 
In the meantime, a few preliminary remarks must be made about the 
meaning of "being-itself",
At a simple level, the term implies a reality which is 
all-embracing, It does not imply (and neither does pantheism), that 
God is the totality of everything there is. But what is implied 
is that God is the source of everything there is, that it is he who 
sustains the universe, and that somehow he is directly present 
Within his creation.
Even from this minimal definition, it can be seen that Tillich s 
doctrine of God differs significantly from the conventional one, 
Clearly the notion of God's immanence, his nearness to his creation, 
is something which will he important in Tillich S model, hhat is 
also Clearly evident at this stage is that the concept 
"being-itself" is going to be a difficult one to attach a concrete
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meaning to. It sounds abstract and vague.. It must be decided 
whether Tillich is able to render it explicable and accessible.
At this juncture it may well appear certain that Tillich has moved 
beyond biblical theism, beyond the. biblical conception of God. The 
issue, though, is certainly not clear-cut, It is undeniably true 
that Tillich rejects the traditional doctrine of God, but this 
traditional doctrine is not the only doctrine one can derive from 
the Scriptures. Amongst the theologians, too, have been those who 
have described God in terms compatible with the idea of 
"being-itself". Indeed, Catholic tradition implies the doctrine 
that God is "ipsum esse" [Tillich in O'Meara & Weisser, p 308,
1964] but then, in contradictory fashion, defines God as a being 
whose existence can be demonstrated by way of deductive reasoning. 
Tillich maintains that the concept of God as being-itself is present 
within Christian theology, but has been suppressed and virtually 
forgotten.
This suppressed tradition which Tillich has uncovered, and on which 
he elaborates, is not an anti-theistic tradition. This point re­
quires continued emphasis, for a superficial examination of the 
issue may render the opposite opinion; Ott, for example, labels 
Tillich a post-theist [Ott, p 6, 1975] and Tillich himself writes 
of the need to transcend theism [Tillich, CTB, pp 176-179, 1979], 
However, despite the apocalyptic tone adopted by Tillich in The 
Courage to Be, it is always a false or limited theism which Tillich 
disparages. The God-above-God whom Tillich seeks to reveal is not 
a new God but the God of the Judeo-Christian tradition, The point 
is that Tillich is not trying to move beyond theism; he is trying 
to help us rediscover its concrete meaning.
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Tillich found an audience, One of its members was John Robinson, 
Bishop of Woolwich. Robinson's Honest to God was published in 1963 
and received widespread attention in the media. Robinson frankly 
admitted to an undercurrent of dissatisfaction with traditional 
religion in England (and in the western world generally). In his 
analysis of the prevailing concept of God, Robinson re-iterated 
familiar Tillichian themes: God was conceived anthropomorphically;
he was seen as a person located in the sky; he was seen as an en­
throned lawgiver and judge who, at the same time, acted with the 
kindness befitting a concerned and loving father. God was seen, 
then, as a being like us, though infinitely superior because per­
fect. Robinson rejected this traditional portrait of God. The 
attention Robinson's book received from the media and the public 
indicated, perhaps, the necessity of what Robinson termed the "re­
luctant revolution", [Robinson, p 11, 1963]
It was Tillich's concept of God which Robinson advanced. Robinson 
sought to translate Tillich into the language of the layman. The 
God-concept presented was held to be more credible in the modern 
World. The unexpectedly enthusiastic response to Honest to God 
suggested that the bishop had struck a chord with the assertion that 
traditional theism lacked impact for the average man. This view 
was enhanced when a follow-up publication, The Honest to God Debate 
appeared. This book included letters from members of the public; 
from these letters it became clear that Robinson had met the prob­
lems and difficulties of a number of estranged believers. Sincere 
gratitude was expressed by those who felt that their faith had been 
restored to them, There were, Of course, dissenting voices, 
[Edwards & Robinson, pp 50-81, 1963]
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Honest to God also prompted a widespread response from scholars and 
clergymen, Every serious religious thinker was forced to recon­
sider the basic theological question: the meaning of the word
"God". The scholarly response to Honest to God revealed a wide 
division of opinion on the religious contribution of Paul Tillich. 
Remarks varied from the laudatory to the bland dismissal of Tillich 
as incomprehensible. Whatever their responses, those scholars not 
familiar with Paul Tillich became aware of him as a theologian 
radically active in the key theological issue of our time.
If the traditional concept of God has largely broken down, as this 
writer believes it has, then Paul Tillich stands at the forefront 
of the new theology. One gains the impression nowadays that the 
question of the nature of God has been put in temporary abeyance. 
Right at present, Tillich is not considered to be particularly im­
portant. Rubenstein's view seems to have acquired a large measure 
of acceptance. He writes: "He (Tillich) had spoken for and to his
time, but we haVe moved beyond that time." [Rv \ -■-nstein, AA, p 206, 
1966] But this simply cannot be so. The challenge Tillich issues 
to traditional theism cannot be ignored. The questions raised in 
the "Honest to God" debate have by no means been satisfactorily 
answered, The issues will have to be addressed again, in the not 
too distant future.
An interesting issue is the one concerning whether the public should 
be directly involved in contentious theological debate. Robinson 
was chided by many religious thinkers who felt that the church had 
been weakened through Robinson1s exposure of his own religious
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doubts to the general populace. One such critic wrote, of Honest 
to God:
... reax.iy the book is not intended for everyone. All parsons 
should read it and all well-educated laymen who are interested 
in Christianity. Other people may well be more hindered than 
helped by the tentative exploratory, question-raising nature 
of the book. Before a new restatement of the Christian faith 
can be offered to ordinary men and women who are seeking faith 
for daily living, a long theological task lies before the 
scholars of the Christian churches. Until then ordinary 
Christians must use the old categories in their prayers and 
in their preaching, allowing their lives to bear witness to 
the truth. [Bryan Green, Rector of Birmingham, in Edwards & 
Robinson, p 89, 1963]
This passage is interesting, for it takes seriously the view that 
a new restatement of faith may be necessary. Yet the tone is one 
of caution. The idea expressed is that in times of theological 
flux, theologians should retreat behind closed doors Until issues 
have been thrashed out and a unified doctrine can be presented to 
a vulnerable public, Radical theologians, such as Tillich, find 
this position unacceptable.
Tillich categorises our age as the age of doubt and meaninglessness.
[Tillich, CTB, p 168, 1979] Any effective theology, then, must 
address itself directly to real feelings of doubt and emptiness.
It is thus wrong to regard clerical admissions of doubt negatively.
"The dynamics of faith," Writes Tillich, "are the dynamics of man's 
ultimate concern." [Tillich, DF, p 1, 1957] The state of ultimate |
concern demands an absolute commitment to truth; the theologian 
who experiences doubt is certainly justified in sharing this doubt 
with his congregation, Together the pastor and his congregation 
must seek the courage of faith, courage which holds in the face of 
abiding uncertainties. Tillich's doctrine of God is the result of 
radical questioning and leads us beyond traditional concepts.
zf*"' -
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Courage involves risk; theologians must, of necessity, display the 
courage of theological exploration if the religious questions of 
modern man are to be addressed, The courage to further the debate 
of God in radical fashion is one factor which makes Tillich and 
Robinson natural allies, Both know the importance of acknowledging 
and meeting doubts, "Doubt," says Tillich, "is the necessary tool 
of knowledge." [Tillich, CTB, p 121, 1979]
There is, in any case, something most unsatisfactory about dividing 
the population up into those who may confront serious religious 
issues and those who may not. This attitude gives credence to the 
view that religious intellectuals are afraid to reveal religious 
controversies to the general public because, if they did so, the 
worshipping members of the general public would lose their faith. 
Such an attitude would indicate that the intellectuals feel that 
faith rests on very tenuous evidence. Edward Bond, indeed, believes 
that the time is near when only intellectuals will be able to have 
faith:
There will always be some people sophisticated enough to do 
the mental gymnastics needed to reconcile science and reli­
gion. But the mass of people will never be able to do this, 
and as We live in an industrial society they will be educated 
in the scientific tradition. This means that in future reli­
gion will never be mote than the opium of the intellectuals. 
[Bond, p 8, 1973]
This scenario underestimates the strength of the religious impulse 
in man, yet it serves as an apposite warning to churchmen, espe­
cially Protestant churchmen, Today one expects to find a high de­
gree of respect for the individual religious conscience. But such 
a principle can only be upheld when a measure of faith is placed 
in the powers of interpretation of ordinary people. Such faith may 
not be misplaced: , the public is not quite so low-minded as
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some Christians appear to reckon," [Evening Standard, 9/4/63; 
Edwards & Robinson, p 40, 1963] We cannot afford to return to a 
time when religious truth is the prerogative of the scholastic mi­
nority, A policy of openness must be adopted by clergymen; part­
nership must preclude tutelage. No other attitude is permissible 
in the 20th century,
It will require a certain amount of courage from men of faith to 
face up to the challenges of radical theology, and acknowledge the 
validity of much of what is being said. The central problem of the 
nature of God is a problem which requires clarification. The 
Judeo-Christian tradition is as strong as its God-concept, If the 
old theistic model no longer satisfies, then a more accessible model 
must be constructed. Unclarity on the concept of God reduces 
theism's power and its prestige, Sensing theological uncertainty, 
Russell comments that the concept of God has become "paler and 
palerj until it is difficult to see what people mean when they as­
sert that they believe in God." [Russell, p 32, 1975] One response 
to this state of affairs is tu deplore the attempts of radical 
theologians to re-interpret the God concept; this response results 
very often in an attempt by theologians to restore the power of the 
traditional theistic picture. Such a stance is not necessarily a 
reactionary one, although this writer questions its Wisdom from 
both a theological and a practical viewpoint, At the very least, 
traditional theism will have to concede important points to its 
critics. Certainly Tillich's critique of traditional theism has a 
Validity that can scarcely be denied. This critique will ensure a 
perceptible theological shift, The full impact of Tillich's Work 
is yet to be felt, It is certainly incorrect to assert that 
Tillich's doctrine of God will evoke only minor interest in the
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future. Rollo May believes that Tillich's eclipse will be only 
temporary, that Tillich will be rediscovered and revalued as an 
important religious thinker. [May, p 92, 1973] Scholars acquainted 
with the "Honest to God" debate can only agree with this viewpoint.
"' /
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CHAPTER TWO
GOD AS BEING-ITSELF
2.1, An infinite God
Paul Tillich rejects anthropomorphic concepts of God. God is often 
conceived of in anthropomorphic terms. Anthropomorphism entails 
the attribution of human characteristics to God. In violation of 
the concept of divine transcendence, God is given a very human type 
of personality. In the Old Testament he is even depicted as en­
gaging in physical activities. God walks in the Garden of Eden (Gen 
3:8) and wrestles with Jacob (Gen 32:24). God is presented as un­
certain with respect to choosing a course of action (Gen 18:17) and 
can be bargained with (Gen 18:24f). He is seen as being emotionally 
vulnerable, grieving over man's sinfulness, while regretting making 
man in the first place! (Gen 6:6). .He is also seen as sanctioning 
and directing military conquest (Judges 1:2). In these cases human 
activities and predispositions are being projected onto the image 
of God as Supreme Being, Anthropomorphic projections may be useful 
When applied symbolically1 (e.g. the comparison between a loving 
hum-in father and the idea of God as Iwing father of mankind.). 
Literal anthropomorphisms. though, ref1 it a primitive religious 
consciousness and modern theism should reject such 
anthropomorphisms.
*i
IA
1 It is hot always clear whether a writer means a statement to 
be literal or symbolic e.g. "At the breath of God the ice-sheet 
is fctmed, and the wide waters are frozen hard as iron , [Job 
37:10;
A
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Another loss obviously primitive religious conception is the one 
which seeks to locate God spatially within a set locale or realm. 
Biblical writers conceived of a three-tiered universe with heaven 
above, the earth below and the waters under the earth. After 
Copernicus and Galilee this model changed to one in which God was 
no longer seen as being "up there" but "out there" in space - a 
cosmic being out in some galaxy. Such a conception is still held 
by many to be the correct one. For those who cannot see beyond this 
conception, but are aware of its limitations, the existence of God 
seems to be an impossibility
"...the number of people who instinctively seem to feel that 
it is no longer possible to believe in God in the space-age 
shows how crudely physical much of this thinking about a God 
'out there' has been. Until the last recesses of the cosmos 
had been explored or were capable of being explored (by 
radio-telescope if not by rocketry), it was still possible to 
locate God mentally in some terra incognita. But now it seems 
there is no room for him... in the entire universe: for there
are no vacant places left." [Robinson, pp 13-14, 1963]
Tillich would agree that God, so conceived, should be rejected.
The atheist, Tillich holds, is justified in rejecting the concept 
of God as a finite being located somewhere in the vastness of cre­
ation. [Tillich, ST I, p 271, 1955] But does theism expect of Us 
that we subscribe to the above-mentioned anthropomorphisms and 
crude Spatial conceptions? What is theism, exactly? The theistic 
concept of God is that concept of God Which fits the Judeo-Chfistian 
religious Understanding. For a definition of theism one turns to 
religious scholars, not to the Bible. The Bible does not present 
a systematic Or consistent concept of God, Henotheism preceded 
monotheism in ancient Hebrew religion; the New Testament appro­
priates the Logos doctrine of the Stoics [Tillich, HOT, p 7, 1968] 
by which to explain the ultimate principle of rational law in the 
universe. Biblical writers were hot so much concerned with defining
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God as with locating him within terms expressing his relationship 
with man. So God is symbolically described as King, Father, Supreme 
Governor, Judge of All, Searcher of Hearts, etc, His nature may 
also be discovered through words and deeds attributed to him. The 
theologians1 task has been to weld the disparate titles, words and 
actions into a coherent picture, The theistic picture is a creative 
scholarly invention. If we appreciate this, we appreciate that this 
picture is subject to challenge and alteration. ,n challenging the 
traditional concept of God, Paul Tillich is exercising the 
theologian's right to formulate or re-formulate doctrine.2 Creative 
theological thought, though, should be circumscribed by a concern 
for the protection of that which is essential in the Judeo-Christian 
tradition. Is it possible to say exactly what such essentials arel
H.P. Owen provides the following definition of theismi "Theism may 
be defined as belief in one GoJ, the Creator, who is infinite, 
self-existent, incorporeal, immutable, impassible, simple, perfect, 
omniscient and omnipotent." [OWen, p 1, 1971] As a general summary 
cf theological opinion, this definition is a good one. Of course, 
the elements listed require explanation, and Tillich s concept of 
God as "being-itself" is built around the terms "infinite" and 
"incorporeal". There is nothing in Owen's definition which Tillich 
would argue with but he would seek to explore the suppressed defi­
nition of God which is detectable within Owen's definition.
The idea that God is incorporeal is in contradistinction to 
anthropomorphic conceptions of God. Having a material body would
2 This principle is, of course, far more powerful in 
Protestantism than in Catholicism.
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limit God, whose infinity must p» upheld at all times. Thus Owen: 
''If God is an infinite nr self-existent being he must be incorporeal 
(for matter is intrinsically limiting)..." [Owen, p 17, 1971] The 
Infinite category most protected by the idea of God's 
incorporeality is that of God's omnipresence; God's aseity 
(self-existence) is also protected by the idea of incorporeality 
since matter cannot be held to be prior to cr co-existent with God. 
So incorporeality is essential. And, at this stage, the tentative 
point can be made that this notion of God's incorporeality is easier 
to embrace if God is defined as being-itself rather than as a being, 
albeit the most perfect being. But the concept of being-itself will 
be examined in detail later.
The presupposition of God's infinity lies at the centre of Tillich S 
doctrine of God, W.L, Rowe distinguishes between this doctrine's 
religious and philosophical aspect: "The religious aspect is ex­
pressed by the statement 'God is that which concerns man ultimately' 
(ST, 1:211). The philosophical aspect of his doctrine of God is 
expressed by the statement 'God is being-itself' (ST, 1:235),
[Rowe, p 11, 1968] Tillich starts With man's existential situation, 
Man, at the deepest level of his existence, experiences an ultimate 
concern, which leads him to seek communion with the source or ground 
of his ultimate concern. But a finite being, especially one con­
ceived of anthropomOrphically, cannot inspire reverent3, Only the 
infinite ground of all being carl meet the need of ultimate concern.
Because God is infinite, We need to use a new category of being when 
describing him. Any being, no matter how superlatively described, 
remains an entity amongst other, Hence Tillich's insistence that 
God is not a being but "being-itself":
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The being of God is being-itself, The being of God cannot be 
understood as the existence of a being alongside others or 
above others. If God is a being, he is subject to the cate­
gories of finitude, especially to space and substance. Even 
if he is called the "highest being" in the sense of the 'most 
perfect" and the "most powerful" being, this situation is not 
changed. When applied to God, superlatives become diminu­
tive:' , They place him on the level of other beings while el­
evating him above all of them. [Tillich, ST I, p 261, 1955]
2.2. God and "exists"
To be a being, then, is to be finite, and Tillich will not compro­
mise on God's infinity. But if God is not a being with a spatial 
and substantial existence, in what sense are we to speak of God 
"existing"? How are we to relate his existence (his being in re­
ality) to his essence (his intrinsic nature)? Tillich argues that 
God's existence cannot be separated from his essence, for this would 
involve a logical absurdity: "An existence of God which is not
united with its essence is a contradiction in terms. It makes God 
a being whose existence does not fulfil his essential 
potentialitiesj being and not-yet-being are 'mixed' in him, as they 
are in everything finite, God ceases to be God, the ground of being 
and meaning." [Tillich, ST I, p 262, 1955]
Thus, Tillich locates God within a different category to other fi­
nite objects; he is that in which there is no split between ex^ 
istehce and essence. So God does not first exist, and then realise 
his true nature; nor does the true nature of God bring God into 
being. Such ideas are absurd. The term "God", properly understood, 
implies an indivisibility of existence and essence.
This reasoning leads to a much quoted and much misunderstood 
statement of Tillich's, namely that one cannot say that God "ex­
ists", Tillich makes this statement in a passage in which existence 
is contrasted with essence, Tillich, as a Christian theist, does 
not deny the reality of God. Taken in context, Tillich s statement 
need cause no alarm, His intention is to protect the notion . v 
God's infinity. He is making an academic point and has no inu«n-:-,v , 
of undermining theistic faith. Tillich writes:
The scholastics were right when they asserted that in God there 
is no difference between essence and existence. But they 
perverted their insight when in spite of this assertion they 
spoke of the existence of God and tried to argue in favour of 
it. Actually they did not mean "existence". They meant the 
reality, the validity, the truth of the idea of God, an idea 
which did not carry the connotation of something or someone 
who might or might not exist... God does not exist. He is 
being-itself beyond essence and existence. [Tillich, ST I, p 
227, 1955]
So the reality which is God is not one reality amongst others, but 
is that which is the source and basis of all being. So, as Hick 
points out, Tillich restricts the terms "exists" to the finiwc and 
created realm: ",.,It is only on the basis of this restricted usage
that Tillich repudiates the statement that God exists." [Hick, PR, 
p 7, 1973] So Tillich is not denying God; he is radically refor­
mulating the way we are to think of him. God is not a being; he 
is being-itself,
2.3. Being-itself as opposed to supranaturalism and naturalism
At this stage it is necessary to look more closely at the concept 
of being-itself, The term does not have a ready meaning for the 
layman or even for the philosopher, Tillich explains being-itself 
bv way of contrast with two other interpretations of God which he
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considers tc ' v invalid, These are the supranaturalistic and 
naturalistic interpretations.
Supranaruralism is the concept of God, already considered, whereby 
God is separated from the creation as a being, the highest being, 
who "brings the universe into being at a certain moment... governs 
it according to a plan, directs it toward an end, interferes with 
its ordinary processes in order to overcome resistance and to fulfil 
his purpose, and will bring it to consummation in a final catas­
trophe." [Tillich, ST II, p 6, 1957] As shown before, this vio­
lates the central principle of infinity with respect to God: 
spatially, by the postulation of a supranatural divine world 
alongside the natural human one; temporally, by fixing a beginning 
and an end to God's creativity; causatively, by making God one cause 
alongside others; in respect of substance because individual sub­
stance is attributed to God. Against such a View, Tillich claims, 
the criticisms of naturalism are valid.
Naturalism identifies God With the universe. This does not imply 
that God is the totality of everything there is, but rather, God 
is the power and meaning of reality. He is nature s creative 
ground, This conception of God, however, fails to separate suffi­
ciently the finite and the infinite. The "creative nature" of which 
Tiliich speaks, this "creative ground of all natural Objects" may 
well be interpreted in the sense of "universe" Without giving it 
the special characteristics of godhead, of divinity, Naturalism 
presupposes a "nature" above the totality of natural objects, but 
such a conception is neutral With respect to character and 
teleology, A third way becomes necessary, a way which presents the 
transcendent power of the supranaturalistic conception, the
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immanent power of the naturalistic conception, and which affirms 
the theistic God of the Christian tradition.
The third conception is the one in which God is called 
"being-itself". As in the naturalistic view, God is the creative 
ground of everything that has being, that is "absolute or uncondi­
tioned Being in which all finite beings participate and from which 
they are derived". [Owen, p 124, 1971] But the divine ground of 
being, unlike in naturalism, is the "transcendens", a term whi'..h 
indicates that the divine ground transcends every individual being 
and the totality of beings.
So being-itself is that eternal but dynamic spiritual force which 
Unrelentingly sustains creativity against the possibility of 
nothingness (or non-being). God empowers everything in creation, 
and all beings participate in this "power of being", yet God ""ttins 
a transcendent aspect, which prevents him from being merely nature 
or the universe. Further, this ground of being of creative "sub­
stance" is the bearer of meaning. Unlike in naturalism, the divine 
ground must have an intellectual base! "Reality is understandable 
because its divine ground has the character of intellect, Knowledge 
is possible only because the divine intellect is the ground of ev­
erything." [Tillich, HOT, p 189* 1968], This, then, is the concept 
of being-itself in rough outline. As has been said, tMs concept 
is a difficult one, and it mus be decided if the term 
"being-itself" has a clear meaning.
2.4, The grammar Of being
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Ontology is the branch of metaphysics which deals with the nature 
of being:
,.. ontology asks the simple and infinitely difficult ques­
tion: What does it mean to be? What are the structures,
common to everything that is, to everything that participates 
in being? One cannot avoid this question by denying that there 
are such common structures. One annot deny that being is one 
and that the qualities and elements of being constitute a 
texture of connected and conflicting forces, This texture is 
one, in so far as it is and gives the power of being to each 
of its qualities and elements,.. Ontology characterises the, 
texture of being itself, which is effective in everything that 
is, in all beings, living and dead, subhuman and human, 
[Tillich, LPJ, pp 19-20 1969]
The problem with a passage such as this one, a problem pointed out 
by philosophical linguists such as Garnett and Hooke, is that 
being-itself is presented as a quality shared by beings. 
Being-itself is "effective in everything that is" i.e. in some sense 
the power and creative energy of being indwells each individual 
being. Garnett's criticism of Tillich is that Tillich has misun­
derstood the logical function of the verb "to be"; the verb cannot 
be used descriptively, as though something is being predicated of 
someone when one says that that, person 'is or exists ■ [In 
MacQuarrie, TCRT, pp 275 & 367, 1981] The very same point is made 
in the criticism of Anselm's ontological argument, that existence 
(or being) cannot be listed amongst the attributes of a being; When 
one thinks of a being, one already thinks of it as existing. Thus
3 It may be countet-argued that exactly such a predicative Us a; * 
is found in the TetragtAmmaton of Exodus 3:14. God, identifying 
himself to Moses says: "l am who I am." The name of Yahweh
came to be associated with, the Hebrew verb hyh or hwh meaning 
"to be". Whether the connection Was intentional or not, it can 
be atgUed that the statement of God to Moses is ^statement 
Which implies that God v, being-itself or he who lets-be 
[MacQuarrie, PCT, pp 196 137, 1977]. The nominalist would be 
prepared to accept this description insofar as it implies God s 
creative activity. He would, though, be unprepared to consider 
seeing God as mat quality or power infusing material beings, 
Such a conception is outside of the nominalist framework.
-  •   —       .
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Hick writes, "To say of X that it exists is not to say that in ad­
dition to its various other attributes it has the attribute of ex­
isting, but is to say that there is an X in the real world," [Hick, 
PR, p 19, 1973] This is certainly true of the ordinary way in which 
the verb "to be" is used, so it is hard to go along with a view that 
seeks to locate a quality or substance called "being" within indi­
vidual beings. At times (and the above quotation is an example), 
Tillich uses the verb "to be " predicatively: "When Tillich takes
it for granteo that 'is1 and 'are' may be applied to all the things 
in the world, he seems to be assuming that the words 1 is' and 'are' 
are the grammatical predicates of the sentences in which they oc­
cur," [Macleod, p 96, 1973]
Of course, as Macleod further points out, Tillich might be seeking 
to recover the true meaning of the verb "to be and thus could claim 
to be indifferent to its ordinary usage. [Macleod, p 96] Certain 
philosophical models could permit such a usage, but these models 
would be unacceptable to the prevailing western mode of thought, 
which is nominalistic. Tillich's main detractors use nominalistic 
arguments to criticise his concept of God,
Nominalists find Tillich's cone,.nr. wf God meaningless. Nominalism 
is the philosophical school which holds that there are no universals 
existing independently Of the actual occurrence of things (so, for 
example, there are trees but there is no meta-reality of 
"trechood"), This mode of thinking. When related to ontological 
concerns, results in the following argument! the universe contains 
many things which exist, but that does not mean that there is a 
quality Of reality called "existence-itself"; there is no such 
thing as "being", only beings. How, asks Ayer, would the philoso­
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pher "depict the whole of reality except through the depiction of 
its parts"? [Ayer, p 3, 1981]
Flew takes the same view as Ayer in God and Philosophy. He claims 
that God must be identifiable in some yjy and he dismisses the 
concept of being-itself as an abstraction, Identification is cru­
cial to an empiricist such as Flew: "it has got to be shown how
what is specified in our definition of the word God could, in 
principle, be identified" [Flew, p 36, 1966] for Flew, this iden­
tification is dependent on God’s being an individual, a being. If 
God is not even alleged to be this (an individual) he cannot be any 
sort of agent, much less an all-powerful will, (p 34),
The nominalist position is also taken contra Tillich by Heywood 
Thomas, who draws on McTaggaft's criticism of metaphysics. One of 
Heywood Thomas's recurring criticisms of Tillich is that Tillich 
relies on metaphysics, and metaphysics is no longer respectable, 
"The sin of any philosophy is not so much that it is wrong as that 
it is out of date and it Can become a commonplace of OUr philo­
sophical talk to say that metaphysics is out of date," [HeyWood 
Thomas, p 35, 1963] McTaggart defines metaphysics as "the system­
atic study of the nature of ultimate reality (p 35)j Heywood 
Thomas is not convinced that one can meaningfully talk of ultimate 
reality at all, One apprehends realities, he argues, but cannot 
extrapolate universals from these!
The only use that the phrase "being-itself" can be said to have 
is that of a shorthand expression for the tr.’nifoldness of be­
ings, Therefore to speak of "being-itsp1 is Something over 
and above particular beings is to commit a :egory mistake, 
It is very like the man who, on being shown the Colleges of 
Cambridge, asks, "But where is the University? [p 36]
■ .
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This, the'a is the nominalistic position! the universe is the sum 
total of its parts, Either God is one of these "parts" (the
greatest "part") or he does not exist,
2.5. Tillich's attitude to nominalism
Tillich basically rejects the nominalist way of thinking, although 
he admits its value as a safeguard against Asiatisation (or 
collectivisation). [Tillich, HOT, p 144, 1968] For Tilll,h, 
nominalism is the cause of most difficulties in contemporary phi
losophy and theology, So he writes; "There is hardly a day that
I do not fight against nominalism on the basis- of my comparatively 
mediaeval realistic kind of thinking, which Conceives of being as 
power of being," [Tillich, HOT, p 143, 1968] Against nominalism, 
Tillich supports the View of mediaeval realism, as opposed to 
modern-day "realism", which is something different: "The word
1 realism' means today almost what 'nominalism meant in the Middle 
Ages, while the 'realism* of the Middle Ages expresses almost ex­
actly What we call 'idealism1 today. It might be suggested that, 
whenever one speaks of Classical realism, one should Call it 
'mystical realism'," [Tillich, ST I, p 197, 1955] It is this 
classical or mystical realism which Tillich asserts against the 
nominalist views
The word "realism" indicates that the universals, the essen­
tial structures of things, are the really real in them. 
"Mystical realism" emphasises participation of the individual 
in the universal and the participation of the knower in the 
known. In this respect realism is correct and able to make 
knowledge understandable, But it is wrong if it establishes 
a second reality and makes of the structure of participation 
a level of being in which individuality and personality dis­
appear, [Tillich, ST I, p 197, 1955] "-v-
/ 1
.... .. J
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Tillich, at the same time, rejects the "extreme realism" of Plato, 
who regarded universals as special things existing in a "world of 
forms" i.e, constituting a duplicate, although primordial, reality. 
[Tillich, HCT, pp 142-3, 1968] Rather, things possess structures 
which man can apprehend, which render the tting» recognisable and 
knowable. For Tillich, knowledge involves the "participation of 
the knower in the known", which means that the mind of man perceives 
the structures of objects, structures which owe their genesis, 
presumably, to the creative activity of the divine mind, Knowledge, 
then, involves a meeting of divine and human conscir zneSs; man 
apprehends structures conceived by divine mind - structures brought 
into being, through manifest beings, by virtue of divine creati­
vity: "Even the empiricist must acknowledge that everything ap­
proachable by knowledge must have the structure of 'being 
knowable1. And this structure includes by definition a mutual 
participation of the knower and the known." [Tillich, ST I, p 177, 
1955] So the subject-object split between God and man is overcome 
through a union of cognition,
This reminds one of the mystical notion, common to both Spinoza and 
Hegel, that one's knowledge of God is the knowledge God has of 
himself, God, as it were, contemplates himself through the minds 
of men, Man's knowledge and appreciation of universals, essences, 
structures is a result of God's informative infusion of human mind, 
Such a view establishes the intrinsic inseparability of God and man, 
Tillich seems to imply such a View when he Writes: "Knowledge is
Union and,., is rooted in die eros which reunites elements which 
essentially belong kn each other," [Tillich, ST I, p 195, 1955] the
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idea of participation is central to Tillich's thinking.^ Rowe ar­
gues that Tillich uses the idea in different ways, but fails to 
explain on any occasion exactly what he means by it. In the case 
of participation of knowledge, Rowe formulates this interpretation. 
"To claim that knowledge is participation is to claim that there 
is some universal shared by both the knower and the known, it is 
to claim that some universal exists and characteristi both knower 
and object known." [RoWe, p 54, 1968] This needi: to be more pre­
cisely expressed. Rowe appears to be postulating a universal re­
ality exterior to God, by which God and man are characterised. If 
that in which man participates is external to the divine ground, 
then a further real y exists a.'art from the finite world and its 
divine ground. Because Tillich asserts that a being participates 
in being-itself, we cannot speak of a shared universal unless the 
Universal proceeds from the divine. But such a universal cannot 
have an independent existence exterior to the divine; the divine 
itself is the universal in which man participates.
This rider accepted, is RoWe not correct in asserting that a union 
of cognition implies some kind of substantial unity between God and 
man? Does One not need a category to explain how God and man "es­
sentially belong to each other"?5 Certainly the idealist model 
would provide a cogent interpretation of what Tillich means by 
"participation", for it uses the category of "spirit" to unite te-
On page 196 of Systematic Theology Volume I, Tillich gives six 
examples of the function of the concept of participation.
5 The answers to these questions appear in the long footnote on 
p 64.
   "   —   .
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alities of being and meaning within one substance. An exploratory 
model seems necessary since Tillich's concept of God cannot be un­
derstood simply in terms of mystical realism; Tillich is insistent 
that being-itself cannot be expressed within the categories of 
nominalism and realism. [Tillich, ST II, p 12, 1957] The idealist 
model is suggested by many elements in Tillich's thought,
Idealism is the "philosophical position holding that the basic 
category of reality is spirit (or mind) and virtually excluding the 
notion of 'thing in itself'." [Deist, p 78, 1984] If there is a 
basic category of reality, then it can be used as a predicate; this 
helps to resolve the problem of making sense of Tillich s 
predicative use of "existence", If the basic category of reality 
is spirit (conceived Of dynamically, and possessing consciousness 1, 
then sonle sense can be made of Tillich's talk of the existent par­
ticipating in existence-itself, and of the knOWef participating in 
the known. The idealist model provides a means of defining "par­
ticipation" .
It also provides a way of understanding the terms "power of being" 
and "ground of being" used by Tillich when elaborating on the con­
cept of being-itself, "Power of being" implies an energetic, dy­
namic and creative force at work within the natural world and, 
possibly, within material objects, "Ground of being" implies some 
sort of "ground substance", something of which objects are com­
prised, something common to being, Idealism, given this
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pantheistic sense, allows us a way of dealing with key Tillichian 
terms.6
Tillich's rejection of pantheism will be examined later, but at this 
stage we should take note of some laudatory remarks in pantheism s 
direction. Tillich asserts that a pantheistic element is necessary 
in every adequate doctrine of God. [Tillich in 0 Heara, p 308,
1964] In Systematic Theology I, Tillich writes: "The pantheistic
element in the classical doctrine that God is ipsum esse, 
belng-itcelf, is as necessary for a Christian doctrine of God as 
the mystical element of the divine presence." [Tillich, ST I, p 259, 
1955] This pantheistic element is important because it guards 
against an exclusively nominalist, approach. Tillich shows some 
appreciation for the monistic view when he rejects pantheism s 
"heresy label" [Tillich, ST I, p 258, 1955].
Other reasons for drawing up an idealist model by which to translate 
Tillich are: Tillich, a self-professod "mystical realist", notes
the closeness of realism and idealism. [Tillich, HOT, p 198, 
1968]; further, as stated earlier, the concept of being-itself 
transcends nominalist and realist categories [Tillich, ST II, p 12, 
1957]; finally, the idealist model seems the most likely one to
* Idealism and pantheism are very close, but the two terms are 
not interchangeable. Spinoza (a pantheist) speaks of one 
eternal substance, with the attributes of mind and extension 
(matter), [See Tillich, HOT, p 370, 1968] Hegel (an idealist) 
holds that Spirit is the eternal substance which exists(prior 
to matter, but which brings matter into being as Spirit s 
dialectical opposite. Tillich explains Hegel s position as 
follows! "All life processes are manifestations of the divine 
life, only they appear in time and space whereas in God they 
are in their essential nature." [ibid, p 4i7] In effect, both 
Hegel and Spinoza share the belief that the power of God infuses 
matter, but their explanations for this differ significantly.
   I'
render a meaning for the extremely difficult concept of 
being-itself; a sphere of reference is essential in this regard.
2.6. An idealist model for being-itself
Tillich, along with the idealist, rejects nominalist thinking. 
Idealism is anti-nominalist because it expands the realistic notion 
of universals into the notion of an all-embracing universal, a basic 
category of reality which serves to unify reality. Thus the prin­
ciple identity is central to idealist thinking. It explains the 
unity of subject and object (man and God) and, more broadly, it 
provides a basis for understanding the principle of universal 
unity:
The principle of identity Says that the one substance... makes 
togetherness possible in the same time and the same space. 
Without the one substance there could not be causal con­
nections between things, and there c uldn't be substantial 
union and separation of different substances. [Tillich, HOT, 
p 440, 1968]
In idealism the unifying substance is spirit or mind; conscious 
spirit, if one wishes to retain both. Spirit is a useful category 
to Use in Understanding being-itself. Nominalist empiricists wish 
to discover God in a specific physical locus. But God, according 
to Tillich, is not an object in creation, nor is he the sum of all 
things. So perhaps an analysis of bein^-itself should lead us out 
of the world of physical phenomena into the world of spirit. 
Being-itself could then be defined in terms of a union of spirit 
and consciousness.
The idea of God as spirit is, of course, biblical I "God is spirit, 
and those who worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth. 
(John 4:24, NEB). Tillich outlines the doctrine Of God as spirit,
vI
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in the idealist context, by referring to the God-concept of Hegel. 
The following passage outlines the position of idealist monism with 
respect to the nature of God:
Spirit is the creator of man as personality and of everything 
which through man as person can be created in culture, religion 
and morality, This human spirit is the self-mauifestation of 
the divine Spirit, and God is the absolute Spirit which is 
present and wotks through every finite spirit... All life 
processes are manifestations of the divine life, only they 
appear in time and space whereas in God they are in their es­
sential nature. God actualises his own potentialities in time 
and space, through nature, through history, and through men. 
God finds himself in his personal character in man and his 
history, in the different forms of his historical 
actualisation. God is not a person besides other persons. ^ 
The absolute Spirit of which Hegel speaks is not a being beside 
the finite spirit, but in God its essential reality is given. 
In time and space it becomes actualised, yet at the same time 
estranged from its essential character. [Tillich, HOT, p 417, 
1968]
By this theory, then, we possess an element - a creative, dynamic 
and energising force - outside of the realities of mind and oody. 
By Hegel's theory we can understand our "participation" ii. God by 
virtue of our possession of the divine Spirit Unde- the restrictive 
conditions of existence. Spirit, then, is the point of identity 
between man and God; man's yearning for the eternal and uncondi­
tional is to be explained in terms of the category of the eternal 
within him - "the absolute Spirit which is present and works through 
every finite spirit",
Rubenstein believes that the God-concepts of Hegel and Tillich have 
much in common. He sees the main difference lying in the termi­
nology used: "Hegel calls the divine ground Ge.st or Spirit, Paul
Tillich preferred to Use the term ground of being " [Rubenstein, 
ME, p 190, 1970] He clearly believes that Tillich is an Idealist,
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whose God-concept corresponds closely to the one outlined by Hegel 
in the Preface to The Phenomenology of Mind,
Spirit is alone reality. It is the inner being of the world, 
that which essentially is, and is per se; it assumes objec­
tive, determinate form and enters into relations with itself 
- it Is externality (otherness) and exists for self; yet, in 
this determinateness, and in its otherness, it is still one 
With itself - it is self-contained and self-complete, in it­
self and for itself at once... [Hegel, p 86, 1966)]
This is idealistic monism, the doctrine that all creation compro­
mises the divine Spirit, Rubenstein contrasts this doctrine with 
the trad ■.'< v.al one, the one rejected by Tilliun,
Terms like ground and source stand in contrast to the terms 
used for the biblical God of history, The biblical God is a 
father-Gcd. He is a creator, a judge, a maker. When he cre­
ates, he does so with substances external to his own nature. 
God as ground and source creates as does a mother, out of her 
own substance, [Rubenstein, ME, p 190, 1970]
Rubenstein believes Tillich's doctrine of God as being-itself con­
forms to the latter description. Being-itself is thus given the 
character of "universal substance" and Tillich is placed firmly 
amongst the idealists (as we have seen) and the mystics: Although
I have cited Hegel and Tillich, I could have quoted a long line of 
Eastern and Western mystics who have had similar conceptions of 
God." [Rubenstein, ME, p 191, 1979] The wisdom of Rubenstein's as­
sessment will be discussed in greater detail later, Suffice it to 
say at tl.i , stage that connections may be perceived between Het ,'s 
idealism and Tillich's doctrine of God through Tillich's terms such 
as "ground" and "source" in connection With being-itself.
7 Rubenstein presents these two models in such a way as ro imply 
that we need not choose between them, The possibility of a 
middle position is discussed in the next section,
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In the Hegelian model, then, there is a very real identity between 
the divine and human spirit, but there is also a split, since ab­
solute Spirit is pure essence and finite spirit is "restricted" or 
"tarnished" essence, as it were; spiritual essence under the unholy 
conditions of existence, Under these conditions finite spirit is 
dependent upon the informative influence of absolute Spirit. Our 
own finite spirit cannot give us the assurance that we are "of God". 
The courage needed to accept our fimtude is not something generated 
by ourselves. The absolute Spirit communes with the finite spirit, 
effecting a Union which brings knowledge - "the Spirit of God joins 
with our spirit in testifying that we are God's children" (Rom 8:16, 
NEB) - and conveys the ontological awareness of our being (in con­
junction with the awareness of the possibility of non-being). [See 
Tillich, ST I, p 181, 1955] The spiritual estrangement implied in 
the Hegelian model is, then, overcome through the revelatory ini­
tiative of absolute Spirit.
It would be. convenient simply to equate being with spirit at this 
stage, but this may not be done, Being is a'ways defined in oppo­
sition to nothingness [Heidegger, p 28, 1959]; whatever is, has 
being, Most idealists would agree that "spirit" and "reality" are 
not synonymous;* matter is a reality of the finite world: material
objects have "being". So, provisionally, we can postulate a duality 
between matter and spirit within the all-embracing concept of be­
ing.
In Hinduism, the Samkara and Advaita School.- reject the idea 
that anything outside of God exists; the wotld is maya (illu 
sion). [Sen, p 37, 1978]
' /  <'/ 
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This is not a controversial distinction to make. Though everything 
that, is has being, distinctions can be made in relation to degrees 
of being. Some entities are held to be more "beingful" than others.
For example, MacQuarrie places angels above men in a hypothetical 
hierarchy of beings [MacQuarrie, PCT, pp 234-5, 1977]. These 
"ministrant spirits, sent out to serve" (Heb 1:14, NEB), it is im­
plied, owe their superior "beingfulness" to their "spirituality ; 
idealists would argue that spirit is of a higher order than matter, 
more "beingful" as it were. Certain biblical passages support this 
view. For example, when Paul talks of the resurrection he formu­
lates a doctrine of bodily reappearance, but this body is a "spir­
itual body". (I Cor. 15:44) Paul goes on to say that, "flesh and 
blood can never possess the kingdom of God" (I Cor 15:50, NEB), so 
we must conclude that a "spiritual body" is very different from an 
earthly one. Its superiority to the earthly body is asserted on 
the basis of the primacy of spirit over flesh.
In the idealist model, then, being-itself, to be pure being, must 
be spirit. But if material objects have being, then we cannot 
permit an absolute separation of spirit and matter. Matter cannot
infuse spirit, but spirit can infuse matter. (The Word may become
flesh [John 1:14] but not vice-versa.) God creates the world, in­
fusing matter with the dynamic energy of spirit. Creation is the 
result of spirit; the spirit of God moves over the surface of the
waters at the outset of creation (Gen 1:2), Creation is subse­
quently sustained and informed by spirit. This is more obvious in 
man than in nature, but Paul is determined that nature has its in­
tuitive spirituality, which can be expressed as a longing for per­
fect reintegration with its divine ground: "The whole created
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universe groans in all its parts as if in the pangs of childbirth." 
[Rom 8:22, NEB]
Now this understanding of being and being-itself may throw light 
on Tillich's conception of God for it explains why being-itself may 
be immanent in and transcendent to the world, at once. In this 
model, being-itself is the creative force behind all that is, 
energising it, giving it its character, but is not identical vi".h 
it. The Hebrew word for spirit, ruah, best expresses it; spirit 
is a breath or wind that infuses everything (as an invisible but 
tangible force) but which is not identified with the totality of 
everything.9 To possess "being" in the finite World is to possess 
spirit within one's material structure. Being-itself, in the 
idealist model, is absolute Spirit; it is never matter (God is 
incorporeal) but is present as energising power within matter. 
Spirit is superior to matter, but matter is not opposed to spirit, 
but is able to contain it and reflect it. Explained in this way, 
the concept of being-itself may be given content, so as to tender 
it intelligible.
This doctrine of monistic idealism may also be described as 
"essentialism" [Tillich, HCT, pp 438-439, 1968] because God is the 
bearer of the essential Structures Of all things. The essence of 
reality is spirit, intrinsic to God as absolute Spiritj absolute 
Spirit predetermines the essential nature of man, the bearer of the 
divine Spirit. The notion that man is created in God's image (Gen
= Psalm 139!7 reads "Where can I escape from thy spirit (ruah)? 
Where can I flee from thy presence?" This suggests God s 
omnipresence.
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1:26) would then imply that God has placed his Spirit in man. Man 
can, then, never destroy that image (the reflection of God's Spirit) 
even if he chooses to define himself in opposition to what he per­
ceives the will of God to be. This is so because God is not a being 
standing over against him; the rebellion against a false conception 
of God is only apparently meaningful. God qua Spirit, is the depth 
of every man's existence and in fact is nearer to man than man is 
to himself.10
The doctrine of essentialism is a philosophy which "tries to un­
derstand the essences in all things as expressions of the divine 
self-manifestation in time and space" and so God in himself is the 
essence of every species of plant and animals, of the structure of 
atoms and stars, of the nature of man in which his innermost centre 
is manifest. All these are manifestations oi the divine life as 
it is manifest in time and space". [Tillich, HOT, p 418, 1968]
In other words the structures of nature are functions of the crea­
tive power of absolute Spirit. And so, following Hegel s thought:
The process in which God creates the world and fulfils himself 
in the world is the means whereby the infinite abundance of 
the divine life grows in time and space. God is not a separate 
entity, something finished in himself, but he belongs to the 
world, not as a part of it, but as the ground from Which and 
to which all things exist. This is the synthesis of the divine 
and human spirit. It was the point most attacked by the 
nineteenth- century theology of religious revivalism, which 
wanted to emphasise the person-to-person relationship and the 
difference between God and the world. [Tillich, HCT, pp 418-9, 
1968]
10 Indeed "nearer to everything than anything is to itself". 
[Luther's idea cited by Tillich, HOT, p 37^ , 1968]
- . ' ■   .........
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Here, then, is a possible model for being-itself: the absolute
Spirit (or being-itself) is said to actualise itself in time and 
space. The phrase "synthesis of the divine and human spirit" sug­
gests a real identity between God and man, an identity which can 
be extended into the realms of nature, The immanent strand of 
Tillich's thought is given prominence in the idealist model through 
the union of the divine and human spirits. As the passage above 
also shows, the idealist model stands in direct contrast to the 
traditional concept of God as a being, a separate entity or person, 
whose transcendence, implies a real separation between himself and 
the World, In typical Tillichian language, Hegel's God is described 
as the "ground" of all existence. The use of this familiar term 
(and others,11 when dealing with Hegel's concept of God) shows 
Tillich's affinity with the idealist model.
There is a strong cognitive aspect to Hegel's concept of spirit 
("Geist" is Sometimes translated as "mind"). The idea of the in­
telligence end purposefulness of absolute Spirit dovetails with the 
conception of God as divine Logos (a term appropriated from Stoicism 
to explain God's creative and sustaining power as described in the 
first chapter of John's gospel, The words "Logos" indicating the 
rational nature of reality) and "Abyss" (indicating the 
inexhaustible and ineffable, nature of reality) are j lined in the 
overriding term "Spirit", [Tillich, ST I. p 173, 1955] The concept 
of absolute Spirit, then, is seen to possess the structures of 
rationality if interpreted according to the Logos doctrine,
11 For example, God is "creative power" (HOT, p 416), the "struc­
ture of reality" (p 418), but he is not a being (p 417) and not 
a person (p 418),
Zerbst--34
"Logos" is the Greek word for "reason" but also means "word". 
However, the term does not refer to revelatory words, but to a 
revelatory reality (i.e. "word" is not understood in a literal 
sense). Since the Logos is the "universal form and principle of 
everything created", it is said to be "in reality as a whole and 
in the human mind". [Tillich, HCT, P 326, 1968] The structure of 
being-itself is, thus, held to be rational, and man (who has the 
divine Spirit in the Idealist model) possesses a rational structure 
which is able to recognise and know the structure of reality. So 
being-itself becomes the bearer of being and meaning: "The Universe
has been created by an intelligent power, the divine ground, and 
since the world has been intelligently built, intelligence can 
grasp it. We can grasp the world intelligently because it has been 
created intelligently. It has a structure. [lillich, HOT, p 326,
1968]
So then, the terra "absolute Spirit" (as bearer of being and meaning) 
may be held to translate being-itself (i.e. finite spirit is part 
of divine Spirit). Also, the model allows us a why of conceiving 
of existence as a predicate; life-giving ""pitit can be seen as 
an attribute. Further, the idealist View SeernS to support Tillich's 
stress on God's immanence and his rejection of the concept of God 
as a distant being, a stranger to the world. The model Seems to 
give scope to the "pantheistic principle" which Tillich considers 
important.
2,7, Tillich's rejection of the idealist model
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There are times whejp Tillich comes close to embracing idealism; 
there are times when his attitude may be held to be fairly ambig­
uous; the doctrine of spirit which Tillich generally supports, 
though, involves a spiritual "correlation' rather than a spiritual 
"identity",
The idea of correlation is crucial in Tillich s thinking, and his 
Systematic Theology Volume I begins with the outline of its method, 
This method throws light on the issue of the relationship between 
the divine and human spirit, The Method of Correlation Seeks to 
show the interdependence of philosophy and theology in thau the 
philosophical questions raised by man in his existential situation, 
find their answers in the answers of theology, To be sure, faith 
is required When one asserts that theology provides the answers to 
philosophical questions, Tillich does not try to establish the 
correlation logically, but a<' tempts to persuade us on tne basis of 
the appropriateness and reasonableness of the theologicj.1 answers, 
"His intenrioh is to show that the Christian revelation is not 
contrary to reason but fulfils it by answering ultimate questions 
that reason can raise but cannot answer," [Thomas, p 393, 1965] 
Reality, for Tillich, is a closed system Structured in such a Way 
that man's rationality (but also spirituality and sentient nature) 
finds its basis and its fulfilment when allied to the divine 
rationality, The idea seems to be that God has structured reality 
in such a Way that man's questions can only find an answer in him, 
The universe has a logos structure; man's ultimate Concern finds 
fulfilment in being made aware of God who created the structures 
of reality, of which man may become aware! "The theologian turns
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towards his existential situation to make clear the universal va­
lidity, the logos structure of what concerns him ultimately." 
[Tillich, ST I, p 29, 1955]
The idea of correlation may also be applied to the category of 
spirit (which includes both the rational and mysterious elements 
of reality). Tillich's stress on God's immanence is given promi­
nence in the described correlation:
Although I am not a mystical theologian,1:2 I would say that I 
am more on the side of the theology of experience and inward­
ness, for I believe that the Spirit is in us. In the concept 
of Spirit the highest synthesis is given between the Word of 
God which occurs from the outside and the experience which 
occurs inside... The problem is the difference between the 
theology of the Word from the outside and the theology of inner 
experience, which is frequently but Wrongly called "the inner 
Word". That is n^t a good term. "Inner light" is better^
In modern terminology We speak of "existential experience . 
The point is that these two things are not mutually exclusive. 
The concept of the Spirit is the mediating power which over­
comes the conflict between outside and inside. [Tillich, HCT, 
p 317, 1968]
This is a significant passage. At first, it looks as though Tillich 
is embracing the idualist view of identity - "l believe that the 
Spirit is in us" - but Tillich falls short of equating Spirit with 
being-itself, Rather, Spirit is seen as a Category Which God and
12 Not primarily, perhaps, (if the term "mystical' is given a 
narrow definition) but elements of Tillich's theology are de­
cidedly mystical in flavour, especially the realistic elements 
in his thought. This is pointed out by Ian Thompson, who 
writes: "He (Tillich) aligns himself with the mystical real­
ists of the Franciscan School of 13th century scholasticism, 
such as Alexander of Hales, BondVentuta, and Matthew of 
Aquasparta, who developed the ontolrtical line of the philoso- 
. phy Of religion. Of this tradition he says, 'The Augustinian 
tradition can rightly be called mystical, if mysticism is de­
fined as the experience of the identity of subject and object 
in relation to Being itself,' (Tillich, TO, p 14 1969) 
[Thompson, p 58, 1961] Tillich consistently aligns himself 
With the Augustinian tradition (see, for example, Tillich, HCT, 
p 104, 1968).
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man have in common, and this category provides the means for 
divine-human communion or corre'i.,1,ion. For- the Word of God occurs 
from the outside" while man's experience "occurs inside".
Tillich's aim is to formulate a doctrine of spirit which shows that 
the "divine light" and man's "inner light" are of the same order 
of being, yet a distinction is maintained between Creator and 
creature. But the separateness of God and man is minimised because 
the human "irtner light", man's spirit, is of divine origin and seeks 
communion with the divine or absolute Spirit. So mutual 
exclusivity" is overcome via a communion of spirit; man meets God 
through the "mediating" power of Spirit,
This mutual exclusivity is, in especial instances, even more dra­
matically overcome. The pneumatological principle, to which 
Tillich ascribes, revolves around the idea that the Spirit of God 
can temporarily inhabit man, thus bringing him to a state of ec­
stasy:
If the divine Spirit breaks into the human spirit, this does 
not mean that it rests there, but that it drives the human 
spirit out of itself, The "in" of the divine Spirit is an 
"out" for the human spirit. The spirit, a dimension of finite 
life, is driven into a successful self-transcendence; it is 
grasped by something ultimate and unconditional, It is still 
the human spirit; it remains what it is, but at the same time, 
it goes out of itself Under the impact Of the divine Spirit. 
"Ecstasy" is the classical term for this state of being grasped 
by the Spiritual Presence, [Tillich, ST III, p 119, 1963]
This ecstatic state, though, is not of long duration, It consti­
tutes a special occurrence, a divine gift, The above passage cannot 
be taken to imply that ^llich is an idealist, Such a dramatic 
moment of Spirit-filled ecstasy briefly unites the creature with 
his creator, b- In his permanent state the creature is separate 
from his creator, The pneumatological event constitutes a special.
Zerbst--38
and rare, dispensation. Tillich's basic doctrine of divine-human 
contact remains rooted in the idea of correlation.
To understand Tillich's doctrine of correlation fully, it is nec­
essary to examine the philosophical roots of his "theology of ex­
perience and inwardness". This examination shows why Tillich 
insists on a re-emphasis on the doctrine of God s immanence, while 
at the same time formulating that doctrine in terms of correlation 
rather than identity,
In Theology of Culture Tillich sets out the two main types of re­
ligious philosophy which have flourished in the western world. This 
examination returns us to familiar ground:
One can distinguish two ways of approaching God: the way of
overcoming estrangement and the way of meeting a stranger.
In the first way man discovers himself when he discovers God; 
he discovers something that is identical with himself although 
it transcends him infinitely, something from which he is 
estranged, but from which he never has been and never can be 
separated, In the second way man meets a stranger when he 
meets God. The meeting is accidental, Essentially they do 
not belong to each other, They may become friends on a ten­
tative arid conjectural basis. But there is no certainty about 
the stranger man has met. He may disappear, and only probable 
statements can be made about his nartire,
[Tillich, TO, p 10, 1969]
This latter view, the cosmological approach, is the view most re­
sponsible for religious alienation, according to Tillich, Our ex­
perience of life tells us that not all persons are likeable or 
trustworthy, Even those who seem friendly may be badly disposed 
towards us. If God is a person, a stranger met, he remains separate 
from us and is capable of rej cting us utterly or withdrawing from 
us forever - "disappearing", The fear of losing the friendship and 
respect of this stranger weighs heavily upon the relig , con­
sciousness ,
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This is the false God, an alien, the God who must die. An 
all-powerful other person, whom one must continual!,, vbey and try 
to please, inevitably becomes a tyrant: "For God as a Subject makes
me into an object which is nothing more than an object. He deprives 
me of my subjectivity because he is all-powerful and all knowing... 
Goc appears as the invincible tyrant, the being in contrast with 
whom all other things are without freedom and subjectivity." 
[Tillich, CTB, p 179, 1979] Man may fear and attempt to placate 
such a tyrant but ultimately will revolt, so God "becomes the model 
of everything against which Existentialism revolted, This is the 
God Nietzsche said had to be killed because nobody can tolerate 
being made into a mere object of absolute knowledge and absolute 
control." [Tillich, CTB, p 179, 1979] Tv. revolt against this 
misrepresentation of divinity is quite justified, Tillich claims, 
and more than that, it is necessary. Man cannot live in bondage 
to his own false conception of God, a conception which enslaves and 
degrades him. This individual God, this stranger, "is the deepest 
root of atheism. It is an atheism which is justified as the re" 
action against the theological theism and its disturbing impli­
cation. It is also the deepest root of Existentialist despair and 
the widespread anxiety of meaninglessness in our period". [Tillich, 
CTB, p 179, 1979] So the false God, the God of transcendence - the 
completely "other" - is rejected in favour of the G<'d who appears 
through the insight of the Ontological method. Yet even in this 
other, and less popular conception, transcendence has an important 
role. The ontological approach does not go over to the other ex­
treme (as one might expect) of bringing God right into the very 
objects Of creation through the doctrine of identity. The notion 
Of correlation preserves the importance of transcendence,
Zerbst--40
This can be seen in the long passage quoted above. Han's 
"estrangement" is real, i.e. he does not possess the actual sub­
stance of the divine, for the divine "transcends him infinitely". 
Yet there is "something that is identical with himself" in the di­
vine; there is a point of identity, a point of correlation (i.e. 
a shared category), but no identity of substance. The shared cat­
egory is spirit, but the divine Spirit is separate from human 
spirit. The human spirit, though, as part of unified creation, is 
dependent on the divine Spirit both ontologically and 
epistemologically. The created world has an intuitive apprehension 
of its divine ground.13 Thus Bonaventura: "God is most truly
present to the very soul and immediately knowable." [In Tillich, 
TO, p 13, 1969]
Such implicit knowledge is the only true knowledge of God, according 
to Tillich. The cosmological method lays the whole question of God 
open to doubt because "the Thomistic method of knowledge through 
sense perception and abstraction may be useful for scientific pur­
poses, but it never can reach the Absolute." [Tillich TG, p 13,
1969] Religious experience is a valid authenticator; deductive 
reasoning never could be; "it (immediate religious knowledge) is 
distinguished from humana ratiocinatio, human reasoning, as Well 
as from scripturarum auctoritas, the authority of the Holy
13 This must be true of nature, too, to make sense of Paul's
statement in Romans 8;22. The "animus" in nature can be said 
to be intuitively responsive to its divine origin, Obviously 
it has no purposeful consciousness.
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Scripture. It is certitude ex se ipsis, certainty out of the things 
themselves, without a medium."114 [ibid, p 14]
We are able to perceive the working of Being-itself immediately and 
certainly because the univ.rse is a structured, closed system. 
Tillich claims that our minds are naturally related to Being 
(through its logos structure); we have the categories to recognise 
the transcendentalia (bonum ipsum the good-itselft verum ipsum, 
the true-itself - both manifestations of the universal reality, 
esse ipsum, being-itself as the ground and abyss of everything that 
is). [Tillich, TC, p 15, 1969; ST I, p 229, 1955] Finite spirit, 
again, is directed towards its ontological and epistemological 
ground.
A possible disadvantage of this ontological approach is that 
rationality gives way to mysticism:
The Augustinian tradition can rightly be called mystical, if 
mysticism is defined as the experience of the identity of 
subject and object in relation to Being itself, In terms of 
our ideas of stranger and estrangement Meister Eckhart says: 
'There is between God and the soul neither strangeness nor 
remoteness, therefore the soul is not only equal with God but 
it is,., the same that He is,' This is, of course, a para­
doxical statement, as Eckhart and all mystics knew; for in 
order to state the identity, and element of non-identity must 
be presupposed,
[Tillich, TC, p 15, 1969]
Tillich here admires the mystical monism implicit within Eckhart's 
system, but cannot embrace it. Unconditionally, He knows that the
114 That is, without an external, man-made medium. The passage on 
pp 36-37 shows that Tillich considers "Spirit" to be a medium 
of correlation. It is ah intrinsic medium though, not one of 
external origin.
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subject-object separation must be overcome if God is not to be "the 
stranger", "the wholly other", but his appreciation of the impor­
tance of transcendence leads him to talk of "an element of 
non-identity" between God and man, This is a weak statement of 
something which Tillich insists on more strongly elsewhere. At 
times Tillich makes Strong statements insisting on God's 
transcendence of the finite realms, "Being-itself" infinitely 
transcends every finite being. There is no proportion or gradation 
between the finite and the infinite, There is an absolute break, 
an infinite 'jump'," [Tillich, ST I p 263, 1955] This means that 
there is no substantial identity between God and man; closeness, 
as has been said, is on the basis of correlation.
Tillich stresses this separation between God and man when he ex­
plicitly denies the idealist idea that God is universal essence: 
"if God is understood as Universal essence, as the form of all 
forms, he is identified with the unity and totality of finite 
potentialities, but he has ceased to be the power of the ground in 
all of them, and therefore he has ceased to transcend them. He has 
poured all his creative power into a system of forms, and he is 
bound to these forms," [Tillich, ST I, p 262, 1955] This is a 
strong rejection of the idealist position, for it makes it plain 
that any theory which posits God as inhabiting finite forms is one 
which severely limits him, making him partially subject to finite 
categories, No part of being-itself (i.e. the part subsumed within 
natural objects) can be of a lesser nature than any other part. 
Being-itself must be held to be indivisible (as traditional theol­
ogy teaches), The qualitative difference between the divine and 
human spirit must be maintained. [Meyer, pp 38-39, 1977]
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This idea is reinforced by Tillich when he discusses the ontological 
polarities of existence. Under the conditions of finitude, equal 
importance must be given to the polar elements of individualisation 
and participation. [Tillich, ST I, pp 220-221, 1955] This prin­
ciple applies when participation is understood to be participation 
in the social community and when it is understood to be partic­
ipation in being-itself, The importance of individualisation must 
be asserted for man ''ceases to be if one of the poles is lost, for 
the loss of either pole means the loss of both . [Tillich, ST I, 
p 221, 1955] Man's freedom is preserved through the pole of 
individualisation. Thus, estrangement from God is a real possi­
bility since there is a real ontological split between man and God,
At this stage it becomes clear that Rubenstein's placing of Tillich 
amongst idealistic, pantheistic thinkers represents an Underesti­
mation of Tillich's belief in God's transcendence. Rubenstein, in 
Morality.and Eros (pp 188-192) Contrasts the cosmological view of 
God with the idealistic one. but does not there extend his dis­
cussion to embrace the ontological approach to God (which approach 
stops short of idealism), In Power Struggle, Rubenstein briefly 
stops to acknowledge the importance of the pole of 
individualisation in Tillich's thinking [Rubenstein, PS, p 162, 
1974] but then immediately goes on to describe Tillich's concept 
of Being-itself in terms of mystical Mediterranean earth pag'-nlsm 
[p 162-163], This line of analysis prompts the judgement that 
"Tillich's conception of God is.., more indebted to the religious 
conceptions of German mysticism than to the biblical tradition",
[p 162] This judgement, perhaos, does not sufficiently take into 
account Tillich's emphasis on God's transcendence and his preser­
vation of all the traditional symbols of God in his semiotic theory,
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In summary, then, Tillich rejects the idealistic model for one which 
emphasises a correlation between Spirit and spirit. In The Shaking 
of the Foundations Tillich talks of "a Spirit distinguished from 
our spirit, yet able to make itself understood to our spirit, beyond 
us and yet in us". [Tillich, SF, p 135, 1948] In this sermon 
Tillich does not directly equate Spirit with being-itself, nor in­
deed does he explicitly do so elsewhere. Tillich claims that only 
one non-symbollc statement can be made about God, namely that God 
Is being-itself. [Tillich, ST I, p 265, 1955] Yet the term 
"Spirit" seems a particularly appropriate one by which to translate 
being-itself, for it successfully encompasses the notions of God's 
incorporeality and indivisibility, It is an important biblical 
term (e.g. John 4:24; 2 Cor 3:17) and can be used to make sense
of the all-encompassing nature of being-itself, as described by 
Tillich.
Tillich describes Spirit as "the aspect of God ecstatically present 
in the human spirit and implicitly in everything which constitutes 
the dimension of the spirit". [Tillich, ST III, p 301, 1964] ihis 
Writer believes that the term can be put to greater Use, For God 
is immaterial and indivisible and cannot be held to operate in any 
other than a spiritual way. Tillich feels that the spiritual 
presence of God appears only in a "definite aspect' [ibid,] holding 
that it does not find expression in the symbols of creation and 
salvation [ibid], But the Bible has passages which support the 
notion Of creation entailing the work of the Spirit (Gen 1:2) and 
the infusion of spirit (Gen 2:7), while salvation is characterised 
by receptivity to God's healing spirit (Acts 2:38). Perhaps, for 
the sake of academic subtlety, there are instances when the term
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"Spirit" should not be used to express being-itself; as a means 
of translating being-itself, though, the term is very useful, es­
pecially when one has to counter theories which claim that 
"being-itself" is a meaningless expression. This is, perhaps, the 
usefulness of idealism with respect to Tillich: it provides a
fairly good translation for "being-itself". Rubenstein roughly 
translates being-itself as Gelst [Rubenstein, ME, p 190, 1979] and 
with respect to this, his contribution is a useful one. "Spirit" 
is a powerful term. It encompasses boththe Logos and the Abyss of 
reality [Tillich, ST I, p 173, 1955]. The term will receive greater 
attention in the next chapter; in this one it will be used as a 
translation of being-itself, for the reason that some translation 
is necessary.
2.8. Tillich and pantheism
Owen identifies a hybridisation of thought in Tillich which makes 
him impossible to label: "One can quote passages from his writings
to support theism, pantheism, panentheism." [Owen, p 132, 1971] 
This is not obviously true with respect to pantheism, although, as 
has been said, Tillich insists On a pantheistic element in every 
adequate doctrine of God to counter "the half-deistic theism of much 
Protestant theology", [in O'Meara, p 308, 1964] The "panentheist" 
classification is justifiable, as will be shown below.
When Tillich defines pantheism, he shows that it is far closer to 
Hegelian idealism than it is to primitive animism:
Pantheism does not mean, never has meant, and never should mean that 
everything that is is God. If God is identified with nature (deus 
SiVe nature), it is not the totality of natural objects which is 
called God but rather the creative power and unity of nature, the
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absolute substance which is present in everything, And if God is 
identified with the absolute of idealistic monism, it is the es­
sential structure o'' 3.ing, the essence of all essences, which is 
called God. Pantht--.. " is the doctrine that God is the substance 
or essence of all things, not the meaningless assertion that God 
is that totality of things, [Tillich, ST I,'P 258, 1955]
Here Tillich shows the inter-relatedness of pantheism and idealism, 
From observations made in the preceding section, it is clear why 
Tillich cannot be labelled a pantheist. The scholars who criticise 
Tillich for being a pantheist misrepresent his position, which 
leads to a false imputation. Thus McLean writes: "According to
Tillich, this pantheism, Which considers God to be the substance 
or essence of all things, is necessary for Christianity. It is the 
very foundation of that divine presence which becomes actual and 
manifest in the circumstances of revelation," [In O'Meara, p 79, 
1964] We have seen that Tillich rejects the notion of a universal 
substance; his doctrine is one of Correlation, not identity, So 
he replies to McLean:
I must sharply reject the assertion that I call God "the es­
sence of all things", In many places I emphasise that this 
dissolves God into the essence of the world and removes his 
qualitative transcendence, It is an essentialistic (formerly 
called idealistic) form of naturalism and it Would deny free­
dom and individuality both to God and to creatures.
[Tillich in O'Meara, p 308, 1964]
So pantheism and idealism posit a universal substance common to all 
reality, Tillich rejects this type of philosophy on the grounds 
that ft denies the freedom (for God and man) given expression to 
in the ontological pole of individualis at ion, Tillich is not a 
pantheist because he insists on a qualitative difference betwe-n 
God and the world,
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G.F. Thomas relates Tillich's God-concept to the doctrine of 
panenthelsm: "...like Hegel,15 he (Tillich) seeks to synthesise
the pantheistic element of immanence with the theistic element of 
transcendence in a way that seems to point to Panenthelsm rather 
than Pantheism." [Thomas, p 411, 1965] This is the meaning of 
panenthelsm, that God is present within the world, but, because Holy 
(the reason for his qualitative difference), he cannot be identi­
fied with it, Tillich's doctrine of God as being-itself may be 
described as panentheistic for "panenthelsm is itself really a va­
riety of theismj one which takes care to stress God's immanence 
equally with his transcendence." [Macquarrie, POT, p 120, 1977] 
Tillich does the concept of God's transcendence just, a by insist­
ing on the qualitative difference between God and man, He also 
shows his respect for the concept through his preservation of the 
transcendent symbols for God, made use of by traditional authority, 
In one branch of his doctrine of God, to be considered now, Tillich 
'. ut-transcends" the cocmological transcendists,
2,9. God and personhood
Thus far the examination of Tillich's theology has focused on issues 
which have importance primarily for philosophical theologians. The 
issue Of God's personhood is one issue in Which the Worshipping 
community has a more direct interest, The category of personality 
has always been ascribed to the theistic God, At first, personality 
was attributed to God in a crudely anthropomorphic way, Nowadays
15 Thomas makes a mistake here for, as has been shown, Hegel's 
essentialism or idealism is expressed in decidedly pantheistic 
terms.
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the reciprocity of the personal encounter between God and man is 
stated in more sophisticated terms; due regard is given to God's 
infinite transcendence of man. [See Buber's I and Th )u]
The correlation of personhood between God and man is stressed by 
Ott: "The primary characteristic of personhood is reciprocity...
and if faith is a personal act, if reciprocity is the essence of 
personhood, then this reciprocity must also be of the essence of 
the relationship between God and man." [Ott, p 51, 1975] So the 
divine-human encounter must be understood in terms of personality. 
Does this then not imply that two persons are involved? If man is 
a person, and he enters into a two-way personal relationship with 
God, then can we not safely say that God is a person too? Tillich 
says no.
Tillich does not deny the existence (nor, indeed, the necessity) 
of personal communication within the religious experience. Indi­
viduality implies personhood, but the individual fully realises his 
personality only when in a state of "communion" with others, and 
he realises it most fully when in a state of communion with God, 
the ground of all personality. [Tillich, ST I, p 271, 1955] But, 
for Tillich, God could never be merely a person. Classical theology 
used the term persona in connection w.'.th the trinitarian 
' 'postases, but not for God himself. [Ibid]
God Car,not be £i person, argues Tillich, for the same feast that 
he cannot be a being! God would then be bound to the categories 
of finitude. Unlike man, God is not subject to the polar split 
between the ontological elements, Which constitute the structure 
of essential being. Tillich distinguishes Self and World as the
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basic ontological structure, which has the following polar 
ontological elements: individualisation and participation; dy­
namics and form; freedom and destiny, Now ''selfhood, individual­
ity, dynamics and freedom all include manifoldness, definiteness, 
differentiation, and limitation. T-> be something is not to be 
something else. To be here and now in the process of becoming is 
not to be there and then. All categories of thought and reality 
express this situation. To be something is to be finite".
[Tillich, ST I, p 211, 1955]
So God cannot be class;fied as an individual without our denying 
his role as participant. God cannot be less of a'participant than 
an individual. Both individualisation and participation are in­
trinsic tr the divine life so that "God is equally 'near' to each 
of them While transcending them both", [Tillich, ST I, p 271,
1955] As the divine ground of all being, God - as immanent and 
transcendent to creation - is at once individual and participant, 
There is no ontological cleft in his nature, "n be cannot be a 
person, unless at the expense of his own participation in his cre­
ation. So, just as God is not a being, so he is not a person,
So again Tillich seeks to protect the idea of God's infinity by 
disallowing a description of God which Would allow him to be 
subsumed within a category of finitude, But God is related to 
personhood in that "he carries within himself the ontological power 
of personality", [Tillich, ST I, p 271, 1955] By t! is Tillich 
presumably means that God is the creative source of individuation 
and personhood; that the autonomy of separate personalities is a 
result of divine action, But if God is the source of personhood, 
but is not a person, how are we express his 'person-likeness'7
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Tillich replies, "He (God) is not a person, but he is not less than 
personal". [Tillich, ST I p 271. 1955]
This stflr.ement represents an attempt to emphasise God's 
trans.H'.','encti, his "wholly otherness".16 A person is an individual 
and hence finite. God is not a person but his nature could not be 
of a lesser order than that of man; he cannot, therefore, be sub­
personal (because a subpersonal being lacks self-reflective con­
sciousness). At the same time, man is able to experience a 
reciprocal relationship with God, so God is not wholly 
suprapersonal. Thus Tillich's solution lies in the phrase "not less 
than personal"; God is able to function at the le el of personal­
ity, but infinitely transcends the category of personhood.
The reason that God was ever conceived as a person, according to 
Tillich, was that, as a person, God could be negotiated with, bribed 
or begged for favours. A person has predispositions, likes and 
dislikes, and can be dealt with on the basis of appeal to Certain 
behavioural inc''(nations. When such an attitude arises, religion 
becomes magic. [Tillich, ST I, p 236, 1955] Such a primitive 
understanding of the divine-human relationship leads to a loss of 
prestige for the Odd-concept, God must be understood to be above 
manipulative persuasion. Tillich has always upheld man's right of 
protest against such a view of God! "Ordinary theism has made God 
a heavenly, completely perfect person who resides above the World 
and -ankind. The protest of atheism against such a highest person 
is correct. There is no evidence for his existence, nor is he a
16 To use the language of Rudolf Otto.
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matter of ultimate concern." [Tillich, ST I, p 271, 1955] It is 
the God of the cosmological approach that is again being denied 
kore. That God, the person, the stranger, is held to be unaccept- 
ably distant from the world. The God of the cosmological approach 
is the God of accentuated transcendence. Yet, paradoxically, 
Tillich (the "immanentist") looks for a transcendence in the divine 
not provided for in the cosmological approach. For the personal 
category itself must be transcended.
H. Ott, for whom personhood is the key symbol for God, agrees with 
Tillich that God could not be less than personal and that. God could 
hot be simply a person among others, [Ott, p 56, 1975] He attempts 
to reassert the cosmological view with ri newed vigour through his 
use of the term "infinite Person" to describe God [ibid.] This is 
Ott's way of seeking to preserve God's transcendence while pre­
serving the idea that God is a person. But this "infinite Person" 
is still h> "completely perfect person" that Tillich will not ac­
cept. In the Tillichian framework the description "infinite per­
sonality" is self-contradictory,for personality corresponds to the 
ontological pole of individuality and God is then seen as finite 
(being subject to categories of finitude). For Tillich, the per­
sonal category automatically implies limitedness. Ott does not 
answer Tillich adequately on this point and because Of this his 
position appears less sophisticated and less developed.1’ The 
tenability of Tillich's doctrine of God with respect to personal­
ity, Will be tested directly. At this stage it must be emphasised
17 Ott's discussion of Tillich's position (pp 53-57) makes ho 
mention of Tillich's analysis of the ontological elements of 
existence. He does not fully seem to take the point that, for 
Tillich, the Very notion of personhood implies finitude.
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that, in this sphere particularly, Tillich does justice to the 
notion or God's transcendence. This chapter begins with Tillich's 
rejection of anthropomorphism. We have seen how this aspect of 
Tillich's thought leads to the denial that God is a person at all. 
Tillich's stand in this connection reveals that he Could not be 
considered an idealist, since there is a side to God which quite 
transcends everything of which man knows. It can scarcely be denied 
that his theology has a strong emphasis on the transcendence of God.
2.10. Critique of Tillich's doctrine of God
Tillich's doctrine of God has served to lead us away from a crudely 
anthropomorphic view of God. It has gone further, though, showing 
how anthropomorphic conceptions are naturally related to the 
cosmological approach to theism. As has been shown, this approach 
conceives of God as a particular being, a person located in space; 
whose existence can be logically deduced. Such an approach is lined 
to the anthropomorphic view because the attributes of invisibility 
and incorporeality are played down. When one talks of a being, one 
presupposes that the thing being talked about has some physical 
form. Theologians of the cosmological school may well deny that 
one need do this, but the way that God is talked about (as a being, 
a person) suggests a tacit predilection for a physical conception 
of God. This conception of a physically constituted entity gives 
rise to the naturalistic philosophy which is crucial to the 
cosmological approach. God is derived Via "proofs" which take their 
Starting point from the World of nature and proceed to posit the 
necessity of God's existence on the basis of a need to find a cause 
for the perceived effects in the World, Logical analysis Works with 
entities and substances, discernable and describable. To posit God
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as the "end point" of a chain of finite causes, is to include him
within the category of finite objects.
As we have seen, Tillich rejects the very notion of the "existence" 
of God since, for Tillich, finitude implies a split between a 
being's existence and its essence: "The question of the existence
of God can be neither asked nor answered. If asked, it is a ques­
tion about that which by its very nature is above existence, and 
therefore the answer - whether negative or affirmative - implicitly 
denies the nature of God." [Tillich, ST I, p 261, 1955] In this 
way Ti'-lich eschews the whole inductive exercise with respect to
proving the existence of God, Being-itself, since it underlies
everything in the universe, cannot be located or demonstrated. It 
eludes any attempts to induce it; Tillich's stress on God's 
immanence dissuades us from searching for God as a transcendent 
object. Being, as it were, hidden within his creation as its cre­
ative source and ground, God can never be an object of rational 
demonstration.
This aspect of Tillich's theology has a particular appeal for it 
does justice to the notion of God's infinite nature, Tillich makes 
it clear that God is not the greatest object within a known cate­
gory, but cannot fit any known category at all, The wholly 
Otherness of God, his transcendent aspect, is given full expression 
within Tillich's theology,
Very important, too, is Tillich's insistence on locating religious 
knowledge Within a dimension in Which reason is present as one el-
■. y - ' \
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ement amongst other affective cognitive elements.11 Tillich's for­
mulation of religious faith is a convincing one which follows 
directly from his ontological theology^ his understanding of how 
being-itself is present to the consciousness of individual being. 
The whole purpose of the ontological approach is to establish the 
nearness of man and God; man's spirit experiences a correlation 
with divine Spirit Which enables man to have art intuitive awareness 
of and partial understanding of being-itself. This is the genius 
of Tillich's system, that by denying that God is a being, God's 
transcendence and immanence is enhanced. For, not being an entity, 
God transcends familiar categories; not being located anywhere 
precisely, though, God may be, as it were, "brought down to earth", 
identified more closely with his own creation. So he cannot be 
indvced (not possessing a particular body or space) but he can be 
experienced because he becomes closely identified with that which 
he has created and which he sustains. And so our knowledge of God 
is derived from all facets of existence: "If God is the creative
ground of everything that has being, everything insofar as it is 
must express something knowable about God." [Tillich in O'Meara, 
p 23, 1964]
To apprehend being-itself, all facets of man's personality come 
into play, In Dynamics of Faith, Tillich explains how faith oper­
ates. The essential point made is that man's response to the in­
finite involves his total person, which means that reason plays a
1 ’ An outline of Tillich's doctrine of epistemi*. faith appears
below.
i
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part along with nonrational15 elements such as feelings, int­
uitions, will. Tillich goes even further, insisting that faith 
(involving the whole of man's being) involves both conscious and 
Unconscious elements of personality, although the non-conscious and 
unconscious elements will always be subservient to the conscious 
elements since faith is essentially a conscious act. [Tillich, DF, 
P 5, 1957]
So the starting point for faith is human experience, the apprehen­
sion of being-itself through the total response of personality to­
wards that which is perceived as being a fitting locus for one's 
Ultimate concern, From within his existential situation, man per­
ceives a correlation between his needs and that which being-itself 
appears to convey. The threat of non-being implicit within extreme 
forms of anxiety is met by an experience of the power of 
being-itself, which may be perceived in everything that is, This 
"power of being" provides the "courage to be". [Tillich, CTB, p 
173-176, 1979]
The location of religious knowledge within the experiential sphere 
is one of the strong points Of Tillich's theology, The cosmologists 
see it as a Weakness, since it cannot guarantee logical certitude, 
The cosmologists claims to establish logical certitude With respect 
to belief, Arguing against Bertrand Russell, Copleston presents a 
Version Of Leibniz's argument from "Contingency"in an attempt to
1 * Stewart argues that the term "nonrational" is far removed from 
the term "irrational"I something irrational runs counter to 
reason, while something nonrational is something outside the 
bounds of logical explanation e.g. experiences of love; aes­
thetics; intuitions, [Stewart, p 12, 1980]
demonstrate rationally the necessity of the existence of God. 
[Russell, p 134, 1967] Of course, if such an argument were gener­
ally accepted, the cosmologists could claim to have a superior base 
for the establishment of religious knowledge. However, such causal 
arguments have met with widespread scholastic criticism. This is 
not the place for a detailed discussion on the logical "proofs" for 
the existence of God. It must be noted, though, that the 
preponderant view is that they carry little weight or, at least, 
they do not readily compel acceptance, Both Hick and Macquarrie, 
whose views may be held to be indicative of informed scholastic 
opinion, reject the "proofs" for God's existence as logically in­
sufficient. 2 1 [Hick, PR, p 30, 1973; Macquarrie, PCT, p 54, 1977]
Tillich agrees with this assessment. He writes: "There can be
little doubt that the arguments are a failure in so far as they 
claim to be arguments." [Tillich, ST I, p 227, 1955] But he goes 
further, arguing that the inductive method is inappropriate when 
applied to God, for Such a method searches for a thing, an object. 
It is precisely betause of its inductive methodology that ,he 
cosmological argument Would remain ineffective, even if the exist­
ence of a "supreme being1' could be established. For we would have 
no reason to confidently ascribe the traditional theistic attri­
butes to such a being, Hick makes this point with reference to the 
argument from Design (also an argument from contingency), He says 
that "even if we could Validly infer a divine Designer of the world)
21 This does not imply that the arguments have no value, Tillich 
believes that they give expression to the question of God i.e. 
they help to elaborate the reasons why man claims to have an 
implicit awareness of God. Natural theology is valuable inso­
far as the "proofs" cast light on such an awareness. [Tillich, 
ST I, p 228, 1955]
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we would still not be entitled to postulate the infinitely wise, 
good, end powerful God of Christian tradition. From a given effect 
we can only infer a cause sufficient to produce that effect; and 
therefore, from a finite world we can never infer an infinite cre­
ator . [Hick, PR, p 26, 1973] So the cosmological approach could, 
at best, establish the existence of "someone there" but the "some­
one" remains a stranger. A rational demonstration could, 
hypothetically, demonstrate that God exists, but could not tell us 
about his nature,
In comparison with this approach, Tillich's ontological approach 
is strongly attractive. As opposed to the cosmological approach, 
it asserts that there is an intrinsic link between God's existence 
and his essence. Therefore, in becoming aware of the presence of 
God, one becomes aware of his nature too. This is the highest point 
of all Tillichian theology; the close association between God and 
the world provides theology with a basis for making assertions about 
God. God is not the stranger, but is present here and now. He is 
knowable through the individ' al's relatedness to that which brought 
him into being, Man's response is not merely "intuitive" or 
experiential ; a hypostasis of all functions of the personality 
is insisted Upon: "Awareness of the Unconditional is itself un­
conditional, and therefore beyond the division of the psychological 
functions," [Tillich, TO, p 23, 1969]
Thus Tillich draws a distinction between "ecstatic reason" (reason 
in hypostatic union with nOn-cognitiVe elements of the self) and 
"technical reason" (reason in the sense of logical deduction),
[ST I, p 60, 1955] Faith never excludes reason, but faith based on
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logical argument will be sterile and Unproductive. Kaufman sums 
up Tillich's position in the following way:
Following his great predecessor Schleiermacherj who directly 
and openly made Gefuhl the ground of all consciousness and 
experience, Tillich sees our ordinary thinking about things 
in the world, as Well as our Scientific knowledge, to be a 
highly restricted product of our limited 1 technical reason' 
and not to be trusted as an adequate basis for overall orien­
tation in life, Such reason is abstracted from the full 
'ontological reason' which includes feeling as well as struc­
ture and which is our fundamental link with reality. [Kaufman, 
p 216, 1972]
Tillich's insistence on such a total and centred response, the re­
sponse of "ecstatic" or "ontological" reason is fitting if one is 
to do justice to the phenomenon of religion. Religion, certainly, 
involves the commitment of the whole man, man as philosopher but 
also man as sentient being. So the cognition of the divine involves 
a special kind of perception. It has a logical side, for God as 
Logos has created structures which are accessible to the human mind. 
It has an intuitive side, for man senses or becomes aware of a 
presence which is powerful and demanding. [Tillich, TO, p 23,
1969] Central to the whole ontological method Stands the notion 
of God as being-itself. For, as immanent within creation, God may 
be perceived in an intuitive, experiential way, If he Were a dis­
tant being out in space, this would be impossible. The" notion of 
God as being-itself is the key concept in Tillich's existential 
theology. This theology stands as a necessary corrective to the 
stipfanaturalism of the cosmological approach. It brings God closer 
to his creation than in the other approach, although God's infinite 
transcendence of creation is always stressed, [Tillich, ST II, p 
8, 1957] Particularly important is Tillich's location of religious 
knowledge within a plausible realm, a realm which also caters for 
every fact of man's personality, For, to seek religious Certitude
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by means of philosophical argument, is implausible at present. And, 
if Tillich is right, the very attempt to do so may be invalid. The 
idea that God is being-itself goes hand in hand with the theology 
of experience. And such a theology does do justice to the religious 
dynamic, Further, experiential theology has a firm L,criptural 
base. No rational argument for the existence of God appears in the 
Bible. Biblical theism takes its point from the collective expe­
rience of Israel and the "numinous" experiences of various indi­
viduals. [Hick, AEG, p 102, 1970] Tillich's strong emphasis on 
religious experience places him firmly within the Biblical tradi­
tion.
From the above, something of the value of Tillich's God-concept can 
be seen "et, this writer is not convinced that the concept of God 
as being-itself will pave the way towards a new theology. There 
are a number of problems with the concept of being-itself, To 
render it intelligible, one has to fin I a meaningful term of ref­
erence for it while at the same tithe upholding the idea that God 
is not a concrete entity, As has been argued, the term "Spirit" 
can be Utilised, for it conveys the idea of divine presence in a 
spatially unrestricted sense, The term is certainly useful, but 
one has to develop it to show how God is the "ground of al1 being", 
in which all beings "participate" and which constitutes the "di­
mension of depth" in reality, If, however, justice is to be done 
to the idea of participation, then the idealist model is the One 
which would accomplish the task, For, in saying that God is 
being-itself, one wants to say more than that God is the creator; 
one wants to move beyond the traditional model, one even wants to 
go further than asserting that the mark of God is upon creation, 
that man is oriented towards God by virtue of an apprehension of
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the divine. The traditional model, despite its depiction of God 
as a being, still contains the notion of man's awareness of the 
divine. The idealist model understands this awareness as being 
implicit, since it conceives of Spirit inhabiting matter. The 
idealist has a strong basis for a theology of inwardness, of expe­
rience - the indwelling of the universal Spirit within finite ob­
jects and creatures. If a theology of inwardness is desirable, 
idealism can successfully express it,
The idealist model is the easiest one to defend against nominalist 
critics like Paul Edwards, who argues that being-itself has no 
"referent", by which he means that there is no object of reference 
in the universe to which we can attach the appellative "God", [See 
Novak, p 56, 1967] The idealist answer is that the energising power 
of the Universe is a force which may be called "Spirit"; it is 
everywhere and infuses each "being" or thing on earth, It is able 
to penetrate matter, to "move through it" as it wera, but is not 
in itself material, and this non-materiality constitutes its 
transcendent aspect, Because the word "being" can be translated 
as "existence", being-itself comes to mean the very stuff of life 
itself, In other words, being-itself can be used predicatiVely 
since the Words "spirit" and "life" can be used interchangeably 
within the idealist model; that which contains "spirit" has ex­
istence, or "being". Such an understanding makes sense of that 
passage (referred to earlier) in Love, Power and Justice, in which 
Tillich (in somewhat Spihozan fashirn) speaks of being-itself as 
being a unifying texture, something "which is effective in every­
thing that is", [Tillich, LPJ, p 20, 1969] Here being-itself is 
used predicatiVely as a quality which a thing possesses, Within 
the context of idealism, such a doctrine makes perfect sense. This
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writer feels that a case could be made for the doctrine of 
being-itself if Tillich allowed the mystical strand of his thought 
to culminate in an idealist philosophy.
But idealism is not a Christian philosophy11 and Tillich wants to 
remain within the Christian tradition, the theological circle. 
[Tillich, ST I, pp Ilf, 1955] Powerful statements of God's 
transcendence in scripture pre-empt an idealistic theology. 
DeUtero^Isaiah imputes the following assertion to Yahwehi
For my thoughts are not your thoughts, and your ways are not 
my ways, This is the very word of the Lord, For as the heavens 
are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways 
and my thoughts than your thoughts (Isaiah 55:8-9; NEB),
This extract Uses the kind of spatially primitive language referred 
to by Robinson and Tillich, but if one strips that away, what re­
mains is a strong statement in support of divine transcendence. 
Sctiptuie abounds with Verses that stress the difference in nature 
between God and man (for example Matt 7:9-11; Isa 64:5-6). 
Tillich's doctrine of God has a strong transcendent aspect in that 
it opposes the view that God can easily be categorised (as the Su­
preme Being) and easily described (via the system of analogical 
predication), According to Tillich, God is not a finite being and 
his attributes must be described symbolically, So, in Tillich's 
theology, there is a role for the mysterious and ineffable. Braaten
11 Because of idealist strains in Tillich's thought, Owen is re­
luctant to label Tillich's theology "Christian" at all. He 
relates Tillich's views to those of Hindu thinker 
Radhakrishnan, [Owen, p 133, 1.971] Owen, however, does not 
sufficiently take into account the strong emphasis on God's 
transcendence in Tillich's thought. A more appropriate criti­
cism would be to say that Tillich, unsuccessfully, combines 
traditional Christianity and idealism,
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sees Tillich's background in German mysticism as being evident when 
Tillich "protests the reduction of the picture of God in late 
nineteenth-century Protestantism to the simple image of a loving 
father". [Braaten* p XXIX, 1972] Tillich insists that the holiness 
of God contains an "abysmal" element - an element which defies de­
scription and comprehension. So Braaten writes: "Tillich Was al­
ways grateful to Rudolf Otto's book, The Idea of the Holy, for 
making him more deeply aware of the abysmal mystery of God, the 
mvsterium tremendum et fascinans." [Braaten, p XXIX, 1972] That 
this is so can be seen when Tillich examines the subject of 
holiness. For Tillich, the experience of God necessarily includes 
a Sense of God's inscrutability. With reference to Isaiah 6 Tillich 
writes: "God can reveal himself only by remaining veiled. But even
the veiled revelation makes Isaiah feel that he is perishing. The 
facing of God, even if it be a mere approaching to his sphere, even 
if God himself remain hidden, means the annihilation of man." 
[Tillich, SF, p 89, 1948]
This experience of "annihilation", which corresponds to Otto's 
"mysterium tremendum", refers to the "subjective responses of 
dread, insignificance, and impotence" [Stewart, p 22, 1980] which 
are elicited in the face if the "wholly otherness" of the divine. 
Now this "wholly otherness" is incompatible with the doctrine of 
identity. What is stressed in the idea of the transcendence of God 
is this: that which constitutes the essence of the divine cannot
be that which constitutes the essence of humanity, So then, by
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virtue of the emphasis of God's transcendence in his thought, 
Tillich cannot be an idealist.zz
The direction of this discourse, then, leads to the question of 
whether the concept Of being-itself can be upheld, given that 
Tillich places fairly equal emphasis on God's transcendence and his 
immanence, This writer is of the opinion that Tillich's ontological 
approach to theology does not satisfactorily accommodate the idea 
of being-itse1f. For the idea of correlation cannot quite capture 
the notion of man's "participation" in the divine, nor does it do 
justice to the idea that God is the "ground" or "depth" of all life, 
The doctrine of identity, rather than correlation, best gives ex­
pression to these terms.
With regard to the notion of "participation", Tillich's doctrine 
of God as being-itself can be shown to be partially efficacious. 
Rowe's Complaint against Tillich, with respect to participation, 
is that Tillich "fails to explain the many different uses which the 
term has in his system", [Rowe, p 118, 1968] It is true that 
Tillich gives the term a wide application. Even if he doesn't ex­
plain the different uses of the term to the degree which one would 
like, he does list the primary functions of participation. 
[Tillich, ST I, p 196, 1955] Two functions listed merit special 
attention, One function is that "the knower participates in the 
known" and the other is the "the existent participates in the es­
sences which make it what it is, under the condition of existence", 
The first refers to an epistemological participation and the second
22 And, as has been shown, he does not claim to be.
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an ontological participation. But when Tillich refers to man's 
universal participation, it is man's participation in the Logos 
structure of r' ’ity which is expressed: "Man participates in the
universe through the rational structure of mind and reality. Con­
sidered environmentally, he participates in a very small section 
of reality,., Considered cosmically, he participates in the uni­
verse because the universal structure, forms and laws are open to 
him." [Tillich, ST I, p 195, 1955] From the point of view of the 
concept of correlation, this is the logical line to take: partic­
ipation in the Universal, and by extension the divine, is primarily 
effected by virtue of a sharing of what the divine knows rather than 
by a sharing of divine essence.23 This type of participation, 
though, is participation in what one may term
23 Here, again, we see a difference between Tillichian theology 
and idealism, On pages 23-24 it was stated that idealism unites 
being and meaning in the closest sense; the power of being and 
the power of mind are both incorporated in the concept of 
spirit. Because Tillich stresses correlation, not identity, 
he denies universal essence. He knows he is on safer ground 
when stressing a union of cognition, for no notion of "sub­
stantial identity" need be involved. However, this union of 
cognition must not be taken to mean that man can "know" reality 
in the intimate sense that idealism suggests. If God infinitely 
transcends man, then the meeting point of cognition will be at 
a very restricted level. The basic meeting point is an aware­
ness of structures, Mysticism, Which implies an ecstatic mode 
of cognition, may lead to more intimate knowledge of the 
supernatural realm, Yet western mysticism stops short of 
idealism, for its state of elevated consciousness is not per­
manent, Idealism, on the other hand, insists on the permanent 
presence of the divine category of spirit. If one understands 
"participation" as implying no more than a knowledge of struc­
tures, then Rowe's insistence on a shared universal is unnec­
essary (see page 23). Correlation takes place through man's 
appreciation of structures in nature (and hate natural theology 
has value, according to Tillich). However, Rowe’s statements 
implying idealism can be understood because of the sometimes 
loose nature of Tillich's language. "Participation is too 
strong to translate a correlation of cognition. Also, 
Tillich's statement that "knowledge,,. reunites elements which 
essentially belong together" permits idealist speculation, 
whereas all Tillich should be pointing out is the creature's 
awareness of his dependence on the creator,
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"consciousness-itself" or "mind-itself" rather than "being-itself". 
As the "power of being", being-itself should be more than that which 
informs human consciousness. And if being-itself is the ground of 
all being [Tillich, ST II, p 8, 1957] then it is the ground of all 
natural objects, objects which lack consciousness, ,3ut nature, 
too, according to Tillich, has an implicit awareness of its creative 
ground, which it proclaims through its various manifestations:
"The psalmist has heard it, he knows what the stars are sounding: 
the glory of creation and its Divine Ground," [Tillich, SF, p 78, 
1948] How is one to explain this sense of communion between cre­
ation and creator, Unless by virtue of an idealist doctrine of 
identity?*1 One'could, of course, say that nature is part of the 
Logos structure of reality (nature exhibits structures) but One 
would still have to explain in what sense nature is "aware" of its 
own "rationality".
Tillich's answer, which opens a Whole new area of debate, is that 
the statement of nature's sentience is "half-poetic, 
half-philosophic", [Tillich, SF, p 82, 1948] Ev : accepting that 
this expression cOmeS from a sermon (sermons being more rhetorical 
than discourses), one has to remark that the expression is hardly 
helpful. Such statements reinforce the idea that Tillich is a 
mystical thinker whose philosophy is tinged by poetics throughout. 
Tillich insists that "God is being-itself" is a literal statement,
i4 If One adopted this doctrine, though, one would have to account 
for nature's sense of its own "fallenness". [SF, p 82] This 
could possibly be done through the idea of the travail of spirit 
under the restrictions of itiaterial existence.
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but if we were permitted to think or it as at least partly 
poetical,25 we would perhaps find it easier to come to terms with. 
Certainly a poetical appreciation seems necessary in interpreting 
the p. rase "ground of all being" by which Tillich seeks to translate 
"being-itself".
The term "ground" permits an ambiguity in Tillich's philosophy.
The wo, d itself can mean "motive" or "valid reason" but it can also 
mean "substratum" or "underlying part". Traditional theology sees 
the first definition as acceptable since it implies that God is the 
creator of the universe. Idealists also permit the second defi­
nition, which implies that God is the very stuff of existence or 
universal essence. Tillich allows the ambiguity to exist; this 
enables him to claim to be a Christian theologian while retaining 
a strong idealist emphasis. This ambiguity leads Thomas to talk 
of Tillich s theology as comprising an "unstable compromise between 
Pantheism and Theism". [Thomas, p 418, 1965] Thomas claims that 
Tillich "seeks to synthesise pantheism and theism by affirming that 
God contains the many finite things within himself and that he 
transcends them by his freedom," He continues that "this does not 
really do justice, to the transcendence and otherness of God, since 
it views God as the Ground rather than the Creator of the world who 
is distinct from his creatures". [ibid,] Clearly Thomas feels that 
Tillich has opted for the second definition of "ground" mentioned 
above,
Not symbolic, Poetics lacks the precise signification of 
semiotics, Poetry permits a wider freedom of association, 
Hence, if philosophy is Coupled with poetics, accusations of 
vagueness are to be expected,
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How we have seen that there is a strong emphasis on transcendence 
in Tillich's theology, and that his method stresses correlation 
rather than identity. But, at times, Tillich's assertion of God's 
transcendence is expressed rather weakly. One passage Thomas may 
have been thinking of when applying his criticism, is the one in 
Systematic Theology II where Tillich states that his theology 
"agrees with the naturalistic view by asserting that God would not 
be God if he were not the creative ground of everything that has 
being, that, in fact, he is the infinite and unconditional power 
of being, or in the most radical abstraction, that he is 
being-itself. In this respect God is neither alongside things nor 
even 'above' them; he is nearer to them than they are to them­
selves. He is their creative ground, here and now, always and ev­
erywhere". [Tillich, ST II, p 8, 1957] This explication of the 
term "ground" leans towards the natUralistic(or pantheistic) view, 
as Tillich admits, but he then goes on to talk of God "infinitely 
transcending that of which he is ground" [ibid.] and this 
transcendence is explained in terms of divine freedom. However, 
Tillich's explanation of this transcendent freedom is not entirely 
convincing. He writes:
The divine transcendence is identical With the freedom of the 
created to turn aWay from the essential unity with the creative 
ground of its being. Such freedom presupposes two qualities 
of the created: first, that it is substantially independent
of the divine ground; second, that it remains in substantial 
unity with it. Without the latter Unity, the creature would 
be without the power of being. It is the quality of finite 
freedom within the created Which makes pantheism impossible 
and not the notion of a highest being alongside the world, 
whether his relation to the world is described in deistic or 
theistic terms.
[Tillich, ST II, p 9, 1957]
In this passage immanence receives a far greater emphasis than 
transcendence. In fact, idealism is strongly suggested in the term
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"essential unity" and "naturalistic" pantlieism is suggested in the 
term "suostantial unity". It is difficult to see how Tillich, once 
he has spoken of a substantial unity between God and man, can go 
on to talk of the two as being "substantially independent". It 
becomes clear that the term "substantial" is not being used in a 
precise sense, here, for God's independence is then described in 
terms of a cognitive freedom from man, not in terms of a. separation 
of "substance".
This is a weak expression of God's transcendence. It depends on 
God's "turning away" from his union with mankind. What exactly does 
this act of freedom constitute? Tillich seems to imply that it is 
an act of consciousness or cognitive assertion. Through 
self-reflective awareness, God is conscious of his superior or 
transcendent nature and thus is free to think his own thoughts, that 
is, engage in an infinitely masterful mode of contemplation.
This writer regards this passage as something of a lapse in 
Tillich's system, In Systematic Theology I, Tillich seemed happier 
when basing his doctrine of correlation on a shared cognitive 
process, Here the emphasis changes to an implied unity of essence, 
with cognition being the area of transcendence. The former emphasis 
is preferable if Tillich's system is to be seen as one based on 
correlation rather than identity, A sharing of divine thoughts is 
a safer base to work from, for it still allows for an infinitely 
large area of non-correlative thought; a sharing of divine essence 
Implies idealism,
Tillich's normal position on divine transcendence is the one given 
expression to in his reply to McLean's criticism of pantheism. It
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is a position which stresses a qualitative difference between God 
and man (see page 42). The above passage, though, shows that 
Tillich enjoys capitalising on the ambiguity of the word "ground", 
He knows that the Judeo-Christian tradition demands a separation 
of creator and creation, but it suits his existential theology to 
blur the distinction at times. Possibly the most trenchant comment 
one can make about Tillich's system is that it seeks to appropriate 
the best insights of two mutually exclusive traditions, without 
fully adopting either. The result is a theology which contains a 
number of important corrective emphases, but which lacks clarity 
because of a certain amount of equivocation. The equivocal nature 
of the term "being-itself" can be appreciated when one examines 
critical reaction to the term. Thomas is sure that it implies 
pantheism [Thomas, p 418, 1965]; Novak is equally convinced that 
it is another term for "Creator", but one which stresses God's 
closeness with that which he has made:
The word "being-itself" does not refer to a power that is 
discovered by its interventions within the universe known to 
science or within the universeknownto ordinary experience.
It refers, rather, to a power that has determined that the 
universes of science and ordinary experience, whatever their 
successive States of affairs, should be rather than not be... 
If GOd is conceived as present in all things, not by giving 
them their character and motions, but by making them to be, 
his transcendence is preserved.
[Novak, p 56, 1967]
This latter interpretation Would be more acceptable from the view­
point of traditional theology. If Novak is correct, then Tillich 
has, by his doctrine of God as being-itself, simply found another 
way of saying that God has Created everything, and cares for this 
Creation dearly, But this explication places Tillich too close to 
the traditional, cosmological position, MoVak does not quite ex­
press what Tillich wishes to say, And Thomas's view imputes Tillich
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with an inherent idealism which Tillich would not accept, Both 
commentators have sought to resolve the ambiguity in Tillich's 
system by venturing to say which side Tillich is really on. But 
neither Novak nor Thomas seem to capture what Tillich is saying. 
This is because, as with the term "ground", "being-itself" conveys 
a sense of ambiguity. It may, in fact, cautiously be admitted that 
the appeal of the term lies largely in its indefiniteness, The term 
does carry a poetical force; it suggests the deepest kind of union 
and intimacy between God and creation. But just as we begin to 
respond to it in that sense, we are reminded that, in essence, 
creator and creature are separate. The poetic aspect of the term 
works towards idealism; Christian theology rescues the term from 
such an interpretation. The result (somewhat appositely, with re­
spect to Tillichian theology) is a polar tension between two mutu­
ally exclusive doctrines. This situation is an uncomfortable one, 
for one senses that Tillich wants to appropriate both classical 
theology and idealism. In colloquial parlance, "he wants it both 
ways", Philosophically, this cannot be allowed,
However, Tillich's contribution is most significant. Even if the 
term "being-itself" cannot be accepted as a clear translation of 
the term "God", Tillich's emphases point to a theological position 
which is other than the traditional one. There are certain advan­
tages in following the ontological rather than the cosmological 
approach When debating the existence and nature of God. At the very 
least, God is no longer seen as an object, but as something more 
all-pervading, This writer feels that the term "absolute Spirit" 
might be a useful term of defini^'on for God as long as it is not 
understood in an idealistic sense, that is, it must be made clear 
that God is separate from the created reality. The term "Spirit"
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dovetails with traditional theistic assertions that God is indi­
visible and incorporeal. It also helps to give greater force to 
the idea of God's omnipresence, since "Spirit" is a term which im­
plies unrestrictedness. Of course, though, idealism gives an even 
greater application to the idea of omnipresence, since God 5s the 
power implicit within organic and material substance in the 
idealist conception. If one follows the doctrine that God is 
Spirit, but not universal essence, one brings God clone to the world 
in the sense that he may be said to surround Us, but not inhabit 
us except in the pneumatological sense. This is as far as a phi­
losophy of correlation can go; it may establish God as the "Great 
Surround", that which brought living beings into being and which 
now is all around it, brooding over the lives of separate beings 
and directing the material world towards its final eschatological 
epiphany. Such a doctrine does not restrict God with respect to 
space, and does not permit an anthropomorphic conception of him. 
Further, it attempts to bring God as close to his creation as pos­
sible without allowing him to be identified With it.
How is the correlation between God and man effected? Through a 
sense of communion, which can be described in various ways. Such 
a communion certainly has a cognitive component; man responds to 
the Logos structure of the universe. It may be said to have a 
"spiritual" component; the surrounding presence of the "power of 
being" communicates something to the sentient part of man, which 
responds to its oWn creative source, The above two examples, 
though, can be subsumed within the idea of a communication between 
persons. As We have seen, Tillich recognises that the divine-human 
encounter has to be seen as involving a relationship of personal­
ities if it is to be meaningful. [ST I, p 24?, 1955] It is time
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to consider whether Tillich successfully accommodates the. divine 
personal category within his theological system.
2.11. An evaluation of Tillich's concept of divine personality
The interplay between divine immanence and divine transcendence is 
of great importance in Tillich's views on God's personhood. One 
reason why Tillich will not allow us to say that God is a person 
is that he feels that equal stress must be placed On God's 
individualisation and participation, But, as we have seen, God is 
neither an individual (in the sense of a separate being or entity) 
nor a participant (in the full sense that idealism would permit) 
because of the coincidence in God of essence and existence. If 
anything, the method of correlation should tip the balance slightly 
towards the pole of individualisation, since the distinction be­
tween creator and creature is stressed in this approach, Even if 
God is not a finite being but absolute Spirit, he is Still "the 
other" in the sense that there is no point of essential unity be­
tween himself and man. Communion takes place at the level of cor­
relation, not identity; the correlation may be powerful, but the 
experience is more like a meeting Of persons than a feeling of 
oneness with Universal essence, The difference between Western and 
Eastern mysticism is this: Western mysticism implies a meeting in
Which an element of awe and apprehension is Still present [see 
Otto's The Idea of the Holyl While Eastern mysticism involves an 
experience of integration with the universal soul, and bliss is the 
essential by-product, It is the same with philosophies of corre­
lation and identity, the former preserves individualisation, while 
the latter stresses the loss of the individual soul in the divine
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Tillich, of course, wants to lay equal stress on individualisation 
and participation with respect to man and God. Certainly Tillich 
is prepared to grant man his ontological autonomy [ST I, p 201f, 
1955]. Man has freedom of thought and action. So on what basis 
can man's participation be expressed? Tillich has this to say:
When individualisation reaches the perfect form which we call 
a "person", participation reaches the perfect form which we 
call "communion". Man participates in all levels of life, but 
he participates fully only in that level of life which he is 
himself - he has communion only with persons. Communion is 
participation in another completely centred and completely 
individual self.
[Tillich, ST I, p 195, 1955]
Now -in this passage Tillich's emphasis is Western and traditional. 
Of course, there is the vagueness of the terms "participation in" 
in the final sentence, which allows some ambiguity to exist, i.e. 
some kind of idealistic Unity could be read into the text. But the 
emphasis is more on encounter than integration; persons meet and 
interact closely. And yet, even if correlation is implied here, 
the idea of identity is not absent because of the looseness of the 
terra "communion", which means "sharing". It expresses more than 
the idea of correlation which means "bringing into a mutual re­
lation". So even if Tillich implies that participation involves a 
close relationship between individuals, his terminology still al­
lows a blurring of the distinctions between the participants. 
Tillich cannot allow himself to be an idealist, but his terminology 
is sometimes loose enough to imply idealist notions.
The emphasis of the correlative approach then, should be on sepa­
ration slightly mote than it should be on participation. God, even
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if not a localised being, is still "other" than man. But even if 
one has reservations about Tillich's assertion that God is equal 
parts individual and participator [ST I, p 271, 1955] , one need not 
gainsay Tillich's assertion that God is not a person. His doctrine 
of God has led us to a realisation that God is not a localised fi­
nite object, and it can go further to show that God can escape the 
category of pers ’.nhood because of the union of existence and essence 
within God.
This requires careful argument, however. For once again we must 
take issue with the troublesome word "ground". Part of the 
immanentist approach lies in asserting that God is not a person 
because, as participant, he is the "ground" of all personality.
[ST I, p 271, 1955] Apart from the fact that the issue of ambiguity 
again arises, it somehow seems worse to say that God is the "ground 
of personality" than to say that he is the "ground of all being", 
"Being can be translated as "existence", and even in an idealist 
sense, this could just mean that God is the "spark of life" in all 
creatures, However, with regard to petsonhood, the ambiguity of 
"ground" could result in a type of idealism which would make non­
sense of the ideas of autonomy and moral responsibility. The most 
one could say that "ground of personality" means is "creative source 
of personal consciousness", There can be no fusion of divine and 
human personality,
Yet Tillich may still be correct to deny the label "person" to God. 
Leaving the trinitarian aspeut of the term aside for the moment, 
we should examine what the term conventionally means, Usually, a 
person is identified either in terms of bodily appearance or dis­
position of character, [Hick, PR, p 100, 1973] With respect to
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God, Tillich's concept "being-itself" leads us away from the idea 
that God has a physical location or appearance. With respect to 
God's nature Tillich does not deny that meaningful statements can 
be made, but the way in which such terms are applied is other than 
the way terms would normally be applied to persons. It will be 
remembered that the only non-symbolic statement that can be made 
about God is that he is being-itself. [ST I, p 265, 1955] Ac- 
ding to Tillich, all other statements must be made symbolically, 
[ibid.] This unusual kind of predicative application points to the 
fact that, when dealing with God, we are dealing with a mode of 
reality for which special rules appertain. Personhood is a familiar 
category of reality; here we are dealing with something that goes 
beyond it. This, at any rate, is Tillich's view.
Very briefly, Tillich's view of applying predicates to God differs 
from that of Aquinas, who Uses a doctrine of analogy. Tillich 
prefers to ascribe predicates to God symbolically. The difference 
between their approaches is a result of their different theological 
methods. Aquinas's cosmological approach to theology claims to 
establish the existence of God, and once that existence has been 
established, certain predicates must necessarily be ascribed to 
God, if the term "God" is Correctly understood. It is Thomist 
doctrine that unaided reason can tell us certain things about 
God,26 Tillich's theology is existential and so Tillich denies that 
symbols of God should arise from logical deduction, but should eX-
26 In Aquinas's gumma.Theologies an attempt is made to provide 
rational arguments in support of the truth of Christian doc­
trine.
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press mfii's existential experience of God.*7 [O'Meara, p 305,
1964] The Catholic view is that" we have objective information about 
God, whereas Tillich eschews such a notion, holding that our know­
ledge of God is subjective, being based on experience.
Although both Tillich and Aquinas display a reticence when it comes 
to ascribing predicates to God, Aquinas is more confident of what 
he can accomplish. For when Aquinas says, for example, that God 
is "good", he claims to be making a literal statement, albeit one 
based on analogy, Explaining the Thomist position Hick says: ,ien
we say that God is good, we are saying that there is a quality of 
the infinitely perfect Being that corresponds to what at our human 
level we call goodness." [Hick, PR, p 70, 1973] Of course, proper
"goodness" belongs only to God; the "goodness" Of man mirrors it,
at most, imperfectly.
It must be pointed out that an analogy both affirms and denies
something, [Weigel in O'Meara, p 10, 1964] and that Aquinas's the­
ology takes cognizance of the ineffective side of analogy insofar 
as Aquinas speaks of "equivocity", the principle that symbols are 
ambiguous. [McLean in O'Meara, pp 154-155] Tillich is close to 
Aquinas here, However, Tillich stresses God's infinite 
transcendence of finite categories, whereas Aquinas prefers to talk 
of analogy in terras of "proportional" differences between God and 
man with respect to certain qualities. [McLean in O'Meara, p 158]
27 And, of course, as such experience changes, certain symbols 
lose their effectiveness e.g, the symbol of the "Blessed Vir­
gin" in Protestantism.
[O'Meara, p 306, 1964]
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On the basis of proportionality, analogy can be effective in the 
Thomist view.
Tillich, however, lest God be seen as the perfect oerson as opposed 
to man ar limited person, seeks to deny the effectiveness of analogy 
by proportion. Proportional comparisons cannot be made if the realm 
of the divine infinitely transcends the finite realm:
That which is the true ultimate transcends the realm of finite 
reality infinitely. Therefore, no finite reality can express 
it directly and properly... Whatever we say about that which 
concerns us ultimately, whether or not we call it God, has a 
symbolic meaning... The language of faith is the language of 
symbols.
[Tillich, DF, pp 44-45,-1957]
This is a very powerful statement in support of the idea of the 
transcendence of God. For if God transcends the finite world in­
finitely, a question mark must be placed against the efficacy of 
analogy, since the "goodness" of man cannot really express the 
"goodness" of God at all. Here the meaning of correlation is to 
be understood with respect to the concepts of grace and revelation. 
Because Tillich is an existential theologian, he maintains that God 
is somehow discernable. However, if God "infinitely transcends 
finite reality", this discernability is on the basis of God re­
vealing himself to man rather than on the basis of an. intrinsic 
relatedness of essence. Revelation is "the manifestation of some­
thing Within the .untext of ordinary experience but it transcends 
the ordinary context of experience". [Tillich, ST I, p 121, 1955] 
Revelation, then, is a special dispensation. Therefore, We see that 
correlation is the product of divine initiative,
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Now, with regard to all this, Tillich shows that he is not an 
idealist but is one who respects the traditional theistic doctrine 
that a distinction between creator and created must be maintained. 
Indeed, he presses the point. His doctrine of symbols asserts that 
symbols applied to God must be both affirmed and denied. [Tillich, 
ST II, p 10, 1957] They must be affirmed because, following from 
the nature of the divine-human encounter, it is more accurate to 
say that God is "good" rather than that he is not; they must be 
denied because symbols cannot essentially capture the nature of 
God's goodness,21
So then, by virtue of the fact that God is incorporeal and lacks 
characteristics which may be literally described, it can be argued 
that he is not a person. Tillich's doctrine of God as personal, 
then, stands or falls by the cogency of the idea that God is "not 
less than personal" [ST I, p 271, 1955]. Owen is quite sure that 
it is unacceptable to talk of a God who is both personal and 
supra-personal. [Owen, p 129, 1971] He goes on to compare Tillich's 
doctrine of God's personality with that of Radhakrishnan, who 
claims that it is necessary to apply personal terms to God because 
the personal category is the highest category of which We know in 
this finite existence. [Owen, p 117, 1971] This, it seems, is what 
Tillich also wants to say. For man to be ultimately concerned, he 
must feel that he is involved in a personal encounter. But God does 
not have to be a person for such an encounter to take place. All 
that is required is the experience from man's side that he is always
Catholics too, tif co-irse, are rbluctant to assert that we have 
"any clear intuition of God':, essence". [Copleston, in 
Russell, p 137, 1967] Yet the,doctrine of analogy comes very 
close to saying at least that much.
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being "held and comprehended by something that is greater than he 
is, that has a claim upon him, and that demands response from him". 
[Tillich, SF, p 46, 1948] It is important that man should be able 
to enter the religious encounter at his ultimate level of compre­
hension; it is also essential that he feels comprehended, So a 
sense of God must be expe..lenced in which loving consciousness is 
involved. But it can scarcely be denied that impenetrable mysteries 
lie beyond such a loving consciousness,
Such a view, then, asserts that God meets man at the levels of 
consciousness and concern. But what of the element of "strange­
ness", of "otherness" implied in such a conception? Does this el­
ement not provide us with a problem concerning God's being knowable 
and understandable? Is the God who can be met but not essentially 
comprehended, one about whom one can feel confident? The man who 
hears that God transcends personhood may feel apprehensive about 
dealing with such a God. The transcendent aspect may disturb him 
for he may think in terms of personality being a kind of "mask" of 
the transpersonal. He will seek some sort of reassurance about What 
lies behind the mask
But at his disposal is the gift of s:..*" -iation, and this gift may 
Well lead him to a point of comprehension based on his grasp of the 
contents of historical revelation. And, on top of this, the 
speculator may receive the even greater gift of communion With the 
divine, The theology of experience provides a context for faith; 
"The ultimate concern is concern, about what is experienced as ul­
timate." [Tillich, DF, p 9, 1957] At the level of personal cog­
nition at which the encounter takes place, man glimpses infinity, 
Trust in the transpersonal aspect of God is based on the experience
« I
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of communion with the divine that takes place at the finite level. 
Man cannot comprehend the nature of infinity (for analogies fail) 
but he knows that he can enter into communion with the infinite (a 
communion he can only describe in symbolic terms). He has faith 
in the transpersonal because he experiences & comprehending love 
at the finite level at which h% operates.
Christianity can go even further. To be sure, divine transcendence 
has an element of incomprehensibility (quite unavoidable when one 
is looking at the infinite from a finite viewpoint), This is pre­
cisely the reason why a divine incarnation was necessary, Thus 
Tillich asserts that JesUs is the final revelation of God. 
[Tillich, ST I, p 148, 1955] Leaving aside the complex problems of 
trinitarian formulation, it can be argued that in Christ we have a 
living example of the divine nature under the conditions of exist­
ence. [Tillich, ST II, p 136, 1957] Jesus claims that "Anyone who 
has seen me has seen the Father". (John 14;9; NEB) This statement 
does not have to be interpreted literally for it to be effective, 
Thus Robinson writes; "Jesus never claims to be God, personally; 
yet he always claims to bring God, completely," [Robinson, p 73, 
1963] Robinson’s statement is in line with Tillich's thinking.29 
It can be argued that Tillich's Strong emphasis on God's 
transcendence with respect to the issue of divine personality can 
be offset by the doctrine that Christ is the New Being - he conveys
29 Tillich has been described as an "adoptiottist theologian ' [e.g. 
O'Meara, p 295, 1964] because of his reluctance to equate, 
fully, the terms "God" and "Christ", He admits f the de­
scription might be applicable to him, [In O ' M e a r 309] God 
cannot cease to be God, and become man, [ST II, p 109] How­
ever, adoptionism holds that Christ was imbued with the full 
power of God (either from birth or when older) and so, through 
observing Christ, we can be sure of God's benevolence,
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the nature of God while cementing a new understanding between God 
and man.
Tillich's doctrine of God's personality, then, can be upheld. It 
does, though, stand at the transcendent pole of his thought. For, 
if God is not a person, his "otherness" is given strong emphasis. 
However, he does meet man at the levels of comprehension and con­
cern. What ultimately has to be argued though (and all theologians 
must address this problem) is that consciousness and concern can 
be predicted of that which is incorporeal and invisible.
Christianity must uphold the idea that the invisible God is con­
scious. Can it do so in a way that is coherent? And can it do so 
in a way that appeals to the popular imagination? The former 
question inquires about philosophical cogency; the latter is in­
terested in a man's worshipping response. Both questions must be 
addressed to determine exactly how we are to imagine the God of 
theism. We must also decide if Tillich's theology makes it easier 
for man to grasp the idea of God,
2,12, Is Tillich's God an imaginable God?
Both the religious philosopher and the ordinary worshipper need a 
God they can imagine, The religious man may well appreciate that 
finite creatures cannot conceive of the infinite, yet he knows that 
man needs a way of thinking about that which he worships. To be 
sure, the believer can claim to apprehend God at Work in the world, 
but he still needs to think of God qua other-worldly being. And 
the natural way to go about this is by way of anthropomorphic 
thinking, "Understanding the world for a man is reducing it to the
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human, stamping it with his seal", writes Camus, Certainly it is 
true that man has -a propensity to translate all aspects of reality 
into human terms. [Camus, p 23, 1975] This applies as much to 
man's thought of heaven as to his thoughts about earthly things. 
Freud, too, has affirmed man's dependence on anthropomorphic 
thought. [Freud, FI pp 38-39, 1949] This is particularly obvious 
when one considers the kinds of anthropomorphism that still exist 
today in the popular consciousness with respect to religious 
thought.10
However, we must not be overly condemnatoryj scorning thor ..no can 
only conceive of the divine in patently ina '.equate terms. Really, 
being finite, what else can we do but use finite categories to de­
scribe God? Of course we have to, but Tillich is correct in 
pointing out that we have to use finite descriptions with due ap­
preciation of their inadequacy. Anything in reality may be used 
as a symbol to express something of the divine nature (and Tillich 
stresses the potency of symbols as much as he warns of their 
limitedness) but finite descriptions will always fall short.
There has to be some way, though, of talking of the infinite, of 
God, without resorting to symbols or anthropomorphisms. Tillich 
has advanced "God is being-itself" as the statement which is the 
least conditioned by finite categories, Is it possible to imagine 
being-itself? Since the term has a certain ambiguity about it, it 
Obviously does not lend itself to pictorial description, If we
31 Novak quotes the of a Russian cosmonaut who, after re­
turning to earth, said that he hadn't seen God, [Novak, p 63, 
1967] The cosmonaut had, presumably, expected to see a somewhat 
large and grandiose human being,
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decide to suppress the transcendent aspect of Tillich's thought and 
concentrate on terns like "ground" and "depth", does an imaginable 
picture then emerge? The most natural idea to spring to mind is 
the one that seeks to equate divinity with substance, even material 
substance. When looking for God, in the most primitive sense, one 
wants, literally, to sea something there. Like the cosmonaut 
searching the cosmic horizons, one wants to rest cme's eyes on 
something solid and tangible. If God is not a person out i.n space, 
perhaps he can then be the totality of all material existence. But 
not even the pantheists believe that, as we have seen (see p. 45).
So we need a mere sophisticated way of translating Tillich's 
"ground" and "depth", We „ antually ha,a to arrive at the term 
"Spirit". Is "Spirit" imaginable, either in the idealist sense of 
being the power and energy implicit within objects, or in the sense 
of a reality Which surrounds material objects?11 Well, Christian 
dogma insists that God qua Spirit is incorporeal, hence invisible. 
Therefore the concept of Spirit does not render a pictorial repre­
sentation of itself. It is clear that the term "Spirit" must be 
understood in such a why that it expresses infinity; but finite 
minds cannot grasp infinity. Nevertheless, this does not mean that 
the concept "Spirit" cannot be imagined; it means that it cannot 
be imagined in terms of pictorial detail. To the extent that man
31 This writer feels that this 1 tter conception best captures 
what Tillich is seeking to express.
Zerbst--84
needs pictorial detail)3z the concept Spirit is lacking in 
attractiveness,
Thie idealist's attempted solution to this problem is perhaps more 
satisfying than the theist's, The kind of divine implicit: ..ss 
Within nature that idealism stresses allows the idea that, in an 
indirect way, God can be seen in nature. Such an idea was given 
expression to by the poet, Hopkins, when he wrote, "There lives the 
dearest freshness deep down things". [From God's Grandeur] Through 
his concept of "inscape", Hopkins drew attention to what could be 
described as the power of being implicit within natural objects.
In the same poem he says; "The world is charged with the grandeur 
of God", implying the inherent working of divine energy within na­
tural objects. This apprehension of divinity Within nature was not 
foreign to Tillich: "He loved to walk - to walk and to talk - and
the sight of sunlight making spring leaves translucent would make 
him halt, breathless, at their beauty," [Novak, p 53, 1967] 
Somehow or other, Tillich intuited, God must be present within the 
beauty of nature, He could so easily have expressed the idea of 
depth in the way Hopkins did, so as to signify the presence of 
universal essence within nature, One senses that Tillich wanted 
to on occasions, Clearly, he was aware of the advantage of pre­
senting nature as the "face of God". Because being-itaelf is an 
ambiguous term, there is a suggestion of naturalism in Tillich's 
system, And this writer is convinced that Tillich somehow wanted 
to retain that element, But idealism never received unequivocal 
support from Paul Tillich,
Houston Smith argues that most men desire some kind of graphic 
representation of God, [Smith, pp 72-73, 1965]
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Thtistn lauds and admires creation, and for the believer nature is 
patently the work of a mighty God. But God, as Spirit, is not seen 
as indwelling matter in the idealist sense, so creation cannot be 
the "face of God" in the theistic view. HoW does theism, then, want 
us to imagine God? Are we to persist with anthropomorphic images, 
all the while telling ourselves: "Of course God has no physical
appearance at all"? Is it not better to stop trying to identify 
God? Were the Hebrews not forbidden to make any pictorial repre­
sentation of God (Exodus 20:4) and dissuaded even from naming him? 
(Gen 32:29) Yet, is it not natural for man to desire a picture^ 
an image, a representation of that which he worships?
Such a desire does seem natural enough but, if theism is correct, 
this desire cannot be met on a literal level. What we are left to 
believe, then, is that God is incorporeal, yet possesses a disem­
bodied intelligence. Within our experience, intelligence is a 
function of the brain, which itself is part of a material body.
Can physics help us to construct a model of something which is 
all1*embracing and invisible, but which has a mind of sorts and, 
presumably, feelings of a kind? The answer, at present, is no.
But then religion is a subject for metaphysicians, not physicists. 
Believers must quite openly proclaim that there can be no physical 
or pictorial model for God from within the finite world, Theists, 
conscious of the primitiveness of anthropomorphic thought, must 
persist with the category of Bpirit. This category must receive 
increasing attention and explication, so that man becomes more in­
fo; .tied about that which he believes to be ultimate,
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Tillich's term "being-itself" has little visual power. Traditional 
theism at least conveys a picture of God, albeit the anthropomorphic 
one of an enthroned, majestic king, Idealism, in an indirect way, 
presents nature as the visual expression of God, and thus has some 
illustrative appeal, Being-itself, if it is to mean anything at 
all, is the omnipresent spirit of the universe. It has no appear­
ance. It is apprehended through its effects (in nature and in man) 
and, noh-pictorially, through the imagination.
The man who fully grasps all this, and still Worships, is one who 
has rejected the prevailing nominalism of his own time. As we have 
seen, nominalism believes in entities and not universals,' Flew, 
for example, argues that for God to be identifiable (at least in 
theory), he would have to bu an individual entity. [Flew, pp 34; 
36, 1966] It seems as though nominalism holds that, for something 
to be, it must have material form. Nominalism, however, would be 
amenable to suggestions that there may be other rorms of existence 
outside of matter as we know it. A nominalist could, theoretically, 
admit the possibility of What could be called "spiritual sub­
stance"; however, this nominalist would only accept such a possi­
bility if this "spiritual substance" was thought of as having a 
shape of some kind. The nominalist can understand the idea that 
God has some kind of shimmering celestial bodily form.33 God would, 
then, still be a thing - a perceivable object which could be given 
a name because it has an instance in reality,
3 3 It may Well be that this is the picture of God most worshippers 
carry with them, One could describe it as sophist.cated 
anthropomorphism, the picture retains the human image of God, 
but it denies that God has a material substance; rather, his 
is a more refined "substance",
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Tillich abjures nominalism. In doing so, he. proposes to teach trie 
western world another way of looking at reality, He certainly has 
• ’udered theism a favour in this regard, reminding believers that 
,ie Christian God is held to be "without body, parts, or passions". 
But Tillich's God is not accessible to the popular imagination 
precisely because Tillich attempts to present a more sophisticated 
concept of God. It would be fair to say that his theological system 
is too complex and "technical" for the ordinary believer to grasp,
But Tillich does not wish to be abstruse and recondite. His 
writings, lectures and sermons differ in the separate demands they 
make on their readers/listeners. Tillich would agree with Miller 
when he says, "Certainly we would be left cold if Billy Graham were 
to conclude one of his evangelistic broadcasts with the 
benediction, 'And may the Ground of Being bless you real good!"' 
[Miller, p 201, 1972] Such a pronouncement from the pulpit would 
be patently absurd. Tillich does use his particular brand of 
philosophical language from the pulpit, but he goes out of his way 
to try to translate such terminology into accessible concepts for 
his congregation,311 He does, too, retain much that is traditional 
and familiar. He would not have thought of Using th term "Ground 
of Being" in a benediction, That he believed in the traditional 
devotional symbols can be clearly seen in his protracted discussion 
on Symbolic theology in Systematic Theology I, there he affirms 
all the traditional Christian imagery, insofar -.is it can be af­
34 For example, in The Shaking of the Foundations, p 57, Tillich 
painstakingly explains what he means by "the infinite and 
inexhaustible depth and ground of all being",
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firmed. Of course, Tillich denies the adequacy of the symbols, but 
makes it clear that they have value. [Tillich, ST I, pp 265ff]
And yet, within the contexts of familiar biblical passages, Tillich 
does attempt to wean his congregation away from the standard and 
prescribed pattern of nominalist thought with which they grew up. 
He believes his listeners will understand, He believes that his 
concept of God as being-itself is translatable, Yet th.ise who break 
new grour.". -specially those who try to lead men -u fine deeply 
entrenched conceptions (or misconceptions), run the risk of being 
misunderstood. Philosophers have found Tillich difficult; how 
much more, then, the general public? To be sure, Tillich's con­
gregations were largely composed of academics and people associated 
with the world of learning. Yet even scholars could find him 
bemusing;
An eminent American philosopher - "the high priest of 
positivism" he was called by the relator of this anecdote - 
Was once obliged to hear Tillich preach am the funeral of an 
academic colleague, Tillich did not speak of hell or heaven, 
nor of the God of mercy and judgement; he spoke of anxiety, 
courage, ultimate concern, and being-itself, Descending the 
steps of the chapel, the philosopher grumped angrily: "Why,
the man is not a Christian at all!" [Novak, p 62, 1967]
The philosopher Was, presumably, puzzled at the way Tillich used 
modern-day terminology to translate Biblical concepts, Being a 
logical positivist (and henCe a nominalist), he would also have 
found the Concept of being-itself „onfusing. One cannot help 
feeling that many people have found Tillich difficult, for similar 
reasons. The modern terminology, though, one could learn to as­
similate; the trans-nominalism of Tillich's thought, however, 
presents difficulties,
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